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Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law
Michael D. Murray1
Abstract
This article introduces twenty-first century law and economics as a school of
contemporary legal rhetoric—a rhetorical lens to test and improve general legal
discourse in areas beyond the economic analysis of law. The recognition that the
rhetoric of law and economics is persuasive—and not just to legal economists—
reveals the enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal discourse
through which to examine the structure and design of the discourse and as a source
of topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the
discourse.
This article presents my conception of the four rhetorical canons of law and
economics:



Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;
The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs;
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The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
Rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral social
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.

The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive implications for
general legal discourse as topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style. I
examine each of the rhetorical canons and explain how each can be used to create
meaning, inspire imagination, and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse in
every area of law.
Introduction
Why is law and economics persuasive? Can the modes of persuasion of law
and economics be used more generally in legal discourse outside the realm of
economic analysis of law?
This article introduces law and economics as a school of contemporary legal
rhetoric. My goal here is not to critique the contemporary law and economics2
analysis of law nor to examine the benefits or costs of the application of economic

I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first century law and economics
that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic approaches to the study and analysis of law. This
shall be distinguished from “new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in the 1960’s
and which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the analysis of law. New or
neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as “traditional” or “conventional” law and
economics. See generally Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) [Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law]; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73; Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77,
83, 138 (2004) [Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism
and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 (1996); Joshua D. Wright,
Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470, 470-72 (2007).
2
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analysis in shaping law and social policy.3 Instead, I seek to examine law and
economics as a rhetorical perspective in law.
Rhetoric and law and economics do not often share the same paragraph in
academic legal writing let alone the same article title,4 but a central focus of the
discipline of law and economics is the study of human nature and human behavior5
in order to predict what incentives can be communicated to humans that will
motivate them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common goal of
rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion. The advocates of the
economic analysis of law must persuade their own cohorts of the truth of their
discoveries, and use the rhetoric of their discipline to do so, and also seek to
communicate the lessons of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal
community, and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider
audience. That law and economics is persuasive beyond the confirmed members of
the discipline is supported by modern history: critics and supporters alike agree

Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained through contemporary
economic analysis of law. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008)
[Cooter & Ulen].
3

An exception being, Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV.
752 (1988) [McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics], a very useful discussion to which I will refer
below.

4

Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [Korobkin & Ulen, Law and
5

Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral theory, and therein lies its true
power."); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) [Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler] (“law and economics
analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior”).
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that law and economics has established itself as the dominant and most influential
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.6
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is persuasive—and not
just to legal economists—reveals the enormous potential of law and economics as a
lens on legal discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and arrangement and tropes
of style in the content of the discourse. The topoi and tropes of law and economics
inspire inventive thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and
the audience. For many members of the legal writing discourse community—
judges, practitioners, government agencies, and academics—the modes of
persuasion of law and economics can provide a critical perspective to construct
meaning and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content,
arrangement, and style. As such, law and economics rhetoric can join the other
schools of contemporary rhetoric7—modern argument theory,8 writing as a process

Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that the movement has become the most
dominant method of legal analysis among legal scholars in at least the last fifty years. See, e.g., Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142-43 (2003) [Hanson &
Yosifon, The Situation] (“The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the law
schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law
and economics [is] undeniable, . . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy and in the judiciary . . .
[making it] the most important development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century.”) (inner
citations omitted); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xix ("[Law and economics is] the
foremost interdisciplinary field of legal studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE
L.J. 1835, 1836 & n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in legal analysis,
including law and literature).
6

Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary Rhetoric, in
THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B.
Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990) [Kinneavy, Contemporary Rhetoric]; John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery,
Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY,
PRACTICE (John B. Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia
7
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theory,9 and discourse community theory10— as a lens through which to examine
and improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse.
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique combination of modes
of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi11 and tropes12 to construct meaning and

Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990); Peter Goodrich, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold,
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION: THE FIRST FIFTY
YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959). See also sources cited in nn.8-10, infra.

See, e.g., Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 75,
80-81 (2009) [Stanchi, Persuasion]; Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An
Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 129, 139 (2006) [Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Linda
L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007) (the corporate metaphor
in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How
the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS.
169 (2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); Jerome Bruner &
Anthony Amsterdam, MINDING THE LAW, chs. 2-3, 6-7 (2002); Frans H. Van Eemeren et al.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Stephen Toulmin et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d
ed. 1984); Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969).
8

See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n. 8, at 139; Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The
Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEG. WRITING 57 (2000); Linda L. Berger, Applying
New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J.
LEG. EDUC. 155 (1999); Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law
Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say
What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Elizabeth
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 163 (1993); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986).

9

See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n. 8, at 139; Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing,
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of
Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); Brook K.
Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills
Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal
Classroom, 34 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is Futile: How
Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L.
REV. 7 (1998); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 35 (1994); Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and
Development, 1 LEG. WRITING 1 (1991).
10

In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = “place”) are the “topics” or
“subjects” of argument that can be made in various situations. Topoi are developed in the process of
inventio [Latin] or heuresis [Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the
type of argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio [Latin] or taxis
[Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement” or “organization” or “disposition” of

11
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to inform and persuade its audiences: the priority of mathematical and scientific
methods of analysis and demonstration, the characterization of legal phenomena as
incentives and costs, the rhetorical economic concept of efficiency, and the lessons of
rational choice theory as corrected by the empirical studies of behavioral social
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science. My examination of contemporary law
and economics as a rhetorical perspective requires the discussion of the following
theses in parts I, II, and III of this article:
•

Part I — Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses its own
rhetoric to persuade the members of the law and economics discourse
community as well as the legal community as a whole.

•

Part II— Law and economics uses a unique combination of modes of
persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropes—the rhetorical canons of law and
economics—which are:
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and demonstration;
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and costs,
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and

the contents of the argument. See Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert J. Connors, CLASSICAL RHETORIC
20, 89-91 (4th ed. 1999) [Corbett & Connors]; Gabriele Knappe,
Classical Rhetoric in Anglo-Saxon England, 27 Anglo-Saxon England 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998).

FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 17,

Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio; Greek lexis) which pertains
to the composition and wording of the discourse, including grammar, word choice, and figures of
speech. See generally Smith, Rhetoric Theory, at 129, 133-34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in
classical rhetoric); Corbett and Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra n.11, at 25-26.
Figures of speech were divided into tropes (creative variations on the meanings of words) and
schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of words). Linda L. Berger, Studying
and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 L. Writing (J.L.W.I.) 3, 51 & n.179 (2010)
[Berger, Law as Rhetoric]. Professors Berger, Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified
tropes as metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word in
two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have different meanings);
periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper name or of a proper name for a quality
associated with the name); personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement);
rhetorical question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox. Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at
51 & n.179; Corbett and Connors, supra, n.11, at 395-409. See also Michael R. Smith, ADVANCED
LEGAL WRITING 199-248 (metaphors), 328-40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [Smith, Advanced Legal
Writing].
12
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o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern behavioral social
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.
•

I.

Part III—The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive
implications for legal discourse as topoi of invention and arrangement and
tropes of style.

The Rhetorical Nature of Law
Law and Economics
A.

Law and Economics is inherently rhetorical

Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry and study, uses
rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions, models, paradigms, assertions, and
predictions.13 To understand the assertion represented by the sub-heading of this
section—law and economics is inherently rhetorical—one must understand the
nature of rhetoric: Rhetoric is the “discovery and transmission of insight and
knowledge.”14 Rhetoric is the discipline that examines “ways of winning others over
to our views, and of justifying those views to ourselves as well as others, when the

13

See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 760; Wayne C. Booth, THE RHETORIC

OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

xii (2004) [Booth, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric]
("[W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything; ‘the rhetoric of philosophy,’ ‘the
rhetoric of sociology,’ ‘the rhetoric of religion,’ even ‘the rhetoric of science.’ Though these rhetorics
are not all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields depend on rhetoric in their
arguments. Most of them are in fact grappling with rhetorical issues, as they debate their
professional claims.") (emphasis in original).
Francis J. Mootz, III, Law In Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and The
Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 317 (1999) (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The
Expressive Power of Language, 107 PUBS. MOD. LANG. ASS'N AM. 348 (1992) [Gadamer, Expressive
Power of Language]). See also James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 695 (1985) [White, Law as Rhetoric] (“Like law,
14

rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always
starts in a particular culture and among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing
others in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and
speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes place with given materials.”).
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question of how things in the world ought to work is contested or contestable.”15
“Rhetoric is primarily a verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic art that is both
philosophical and practical and gives rise to potentially active texts.”16 Much of the
scholarly attention within the discipline of rhetoric has been directed to effective
communication with a particular focus on techniques for persuasive communication
and argumentation; thus, many familiar definitions of rhetoric revolve around
persuasion in discourse.17
In this article, I am referring to the academic study of rhetoric, both in its
classical18 and contemporary19 forms. Rhetoric as the study of persuasion and

Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, MINDING THE LAW 14 (2002). See also White, Law as
Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 684 (rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the community and the
culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of the Practice of Law, February 14, 2002
Roundtable Discussion, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2002) [White, Theology of Law] (“[T]he
minute we begin to think and talk about anything at all we live in the world of language, a world of
contingent resources for thought and speech, and rhetoric is a perfectly good term for how we do
that.”).
15

William A. Covino & David A. Joliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC: CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS,
BOUNDARIES 5 (1995).
16

See, e.g., Aristotle, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W. Rhys Roberts transl. 1965) [Aristotle, The
Rhetoric], available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/Rhetoric/ (last accessed Nov. 22, 2010)
(Lee Honeycutt ed.) (“Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the
available means of persuasion.”); Aristotle, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 1355B
(George A. Kennedy transl. 1991); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76
VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 n.14 (1990) [Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial] (“By ‘rhetoric,’ I mean the
discipline . . . in which the objects of formal study are the conventions of discourse and argument.”);
Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS
AND PERSUASION 9 (2009) [Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers] (“[R]hetoric here refers to
the art of persuasion through eloquent, inventive, and strategically organized discourse, both oral
and written.”); John J. Makay, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE: COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND ATTITUDES
9 (3d ed. 1984) [Makay, Speaking With an Audience] (“Rhetoric is defined ‘as the process of human
communication in which a speaker sorts, selects, and sends symbols for the specific purpose of
evoking a precise response’ from an audience.”).
17

“Classical rhetoric” was begun in the fifth century B.C.E. and continued on and perfected over the
course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. See
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 15-16, 18-19. Even after this reign as the defining study of public
discourse in classical times, the scholarship and teachings of classical rhetoric were followed as the
dominant discipline for developing legal arguments until the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

18
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See id. at 2, 15. The origin of classical rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse
and argumentation is traced to Corax of Syracuse. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical
Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615 (1999) [Frost, Lost Heritage]. The
early tenets of the discipline were critiqued by Socrates and by Socrates’ student, Plato, see infra
n.20, and subsequently they were refined by Plato’s student, Aristotle. See John H. Mackin,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6-7, 17-18, 26 (1969). The most important writings
of classical rhetoric are those of Aristotle, Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.17, Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Cicero, DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell transl., 1949); Marcus Tullius Cicero, DE ORATORE
(E.W. Sutton transl., 1942), and Quintilian, 1 Marius Fabius Quintilian, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273
(H.E. Butler transl., 1954), which together define the canons of the discipline that serve as a
rhetorical lens on legal discourse.
19 The contemporary period of rhetoric begins in the Twentieth Century. Major movements in
thought have broadened the study of rhetoric to include all aspects of communication, RobbinsTiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 61, including linguistics, ethics and persuasion,
practical reasoning, human motivation, composition theories, cognitive studies, and socio-epistemic
studies. Id. at 61-82. See, e.g., I.A. Richards, The PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC (1936) (language and
meaning); C. K. Ogden & I.A. Richards, THE MEANING OF MEANING (1972) (language and meaning);
Roland Barthes, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1968) (language as
symbols); Umberto Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976) (language as symbols); Lloyd F. Bitzer, The
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 6-8, 389-92 (1968) [Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation] (the
impact of situation); Kenneth Burke, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1969) [Burke, Grammar of Motives]
(impact of culture); Kenneth Burke, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950) [Burke, Rhetoric of Motives]
(impact of culture); Marshall McLuhan, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1996)
(modern media studies); Richard M. Weaver, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (ethics). Over time,
the cognitive rhetoric group divided into the process theory cognitivists, who believe that the study of
rhetoric should focus on the process of writing, a recursive rather than linear creative process, that
teaches the writer how to reason and persuade and improve their communication by examining each
stage of the writing process, see Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 79, and
the discourse community cognitivists, who believe the study of rhetoric is a study of the writer’s
assimilation into and acceptance of the tenets, vocabulary, and expectations of a discourse
community, such as the legal writing discourse community. See, e.g., Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric for
Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 80. The socio-epistemic group combines social theories of community
with epistemological theories of learning to form a theory of communication that considers the
interaction of speaker, subject matter, and audience. See id. at 81.
The common thread among these the schools of thought in the developing discipline of
contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking on the nature of knowledge and truth. Kristen K.
Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal
and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS'N L. WRITING DIRS. 108, 123 (2006) [Robbins, Philosophy v.
Rhetoric]. Beginning in the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman asserted that truth is
relative. Id. See, e.g., Stephen E. Toulmin, USES OF ARGUMENT (updated ed. 2003) [Toulmin, Uses of
Argument]; Chaim Perelman, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (William Kluback trans., 1982) [Perelman,
Realm of Rhetoric]; Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8. Toulmin argued that people in
everyday life do not use Aristotelian logic to establish conclusive proof, but "informal logic" to reason
and to acquire knowledge. Toulmin, supra n.8, at 94-134. The knowledge acquired and the
arguments made are only probable, not absolute. Id. Like Toulmin, Perelman argued that appeals to
reason lead only to probable truths: “the appeal to reason must be identified not as an appeal to a
single truth but instead as an appeal for the adherence of an audience. . . .” Chaim Perelman, THE
NEW RHETORIC: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING, GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234-52 (1970) [Perelman,
The New Rhetoric] (as reprinted in James L. Golden et al., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT
234-52 (6th ed. 1997)). From these beginnings, three contemporary theories of rhetoric arose to focus
on the construction of meaning, the creation of arguments, and the processes that allow the creation
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argument has a noble and classical tradition, but the discipline has had difficulty
shaking off a common but enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources: Socrates
and Plato described the early study and practice of rhetoric by the ancient Greek
Sophists as the art of flattery and trickery,20 and throughout the ages the slur has
stuck. I emphasize that this slur is not the subject of my study here. Rhetoric, the
academic discipline, is not the study of hollow speech, not puffery designed to prop
up specious assertions, not hyperbole employed to distract an audience from the
truths or falsities of the speakers’ position.21 In short, it is nothing like the meaning
of the commonplace phrase, “mere rhetoric.”22 I am not examining law and
economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a discipline with a welldeveloped system of argumentation and persuasion that has lessons for legal
discourse beyond the realm of economic analysis of law.

of meaning and argumentation. See Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43
J. LEGAL ED. 108, 118-21 (1993). These are: Modern Argument Theory, Writing as a Process Theory,
and the Theory of Discourse Communities. See Michael Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139.
Socrates did not devote his time to the publication of works, so we rely on Plato whose writings
purport to represent Socrates’ criticisms of rhetoric in such famous dialogues as Plato, PHAEDRUS,
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010), Plato,
GORGIAS, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/15_gorgias.htm (last accessed Dec. 27,
2010), and Plato, PHAEDO, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/14_phaedo.htm (last
accessed Dec. 27, 2010).
20

See, e.g., Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 COLL. COMP. &
COM. 139, 139 (1963) [Booth, The Rhetorical Stance]; Wayne C. Booth, The Idea of a University as
Seen by a Rhetorician, 1987 Ryerson Lecture, University of Chicago, available at
http://home.uchicago.edu/ ~ahkissel/booth/booth.htm (last accessed Nov. 23, 2010) [Booth, Idea of a
University]; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3-4 (1982).
21

See Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal
Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUIN. L. REV. 813, 817, 829 (2003); Booth, The Rhetorical
Stance, supra n.21, at 139; Booth, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, supra n.13, at vii, x, 6-7.
22
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Excerpts from the
the History of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics

The discipline of economics is rhetorical,23 and the discipline of law and
economics is rhetorical, too.24 Adam Smith, the honorary father of economics,
apparently understood the rhetorical imperatives of economics and the law when, in
his Lectures on Jurisprudence concerning principle in the human mind and the
division of labor, he commented on the topic of exchanges and self interest: “The
offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so for it is in his
interest. . . . Men always endevour {sic} to persuade others to be of their opinion
even when the matter is of no consequence to them. . . . And in this manner every
one is practicing oratory on others thro {sic} the whole of his life.”25 Robert L.
Heilbroner interprets Smith to mean that “the basis for economic relationships lies
not in a disinterested calculation of advantages, but in the ‘faculties of reason and
speech’ that underlie the capacity for persuasion.”26

See Deirdre N. McCloskey, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS xix-xx, 5 (2d ed. 1998) [McCloskey,
Rhetoric of Economics] [Note that the author, Donald N. McCloskey, became Deirdre N. McCloskey;
the two names refer to the same author, but in my citations I will use the name or names used at the
time of publication of the works cited here]; Arjo Klamer & Donald N. McCloskey, Economics in the
Human Conversation, in Arjo Klamer, Donald N. McCloskey & Robert M. Solow, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 3-4, 11 (1988); see generally Donald N. McCloskey &
Deirdre N. McCloskey, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 38-52 (1994).
23

24

McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 760;

Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, as quoted in Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and
Idealogy, in Arjo Klamer, Donald N. McCloskey & Robert M. Solow, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
25

ECONOMIC RHETORIC at 38 (1988) [Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy].
26

Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, as quoted in Cooter and Ulen’s seminal text on law
and economics,27 held that: “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and master of economics. . . . We learn that for everything we have to give up
something else, and we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when we elect.”28
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric of law and
economics as follows:
[T]he most interesting aspect of the law and economics movement has been
its aspiration to place the study of law on a scientific basis, with coherent
theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of
the hypotheses. Law is . . . amenable to scientific study. Economics is the
most advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system contains many
parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have studied
successfully.29
[The economic] approach enables the law to be seen, grasped, and studied as
a system—a system that economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as
coherent, and in places improve. By the same token, the approach enables
economics to be seen as a tool for understanding and reforming social
practices, rather than merely as a formal system of daunting mathematical
complexity.30

27

Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (5th ed. 2008) [Cooter & Ulen].

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469, 474 (1897), as quoted in
Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 1.

28

Richard A. Posner, Foreword, to Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, ESSAYS IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 5, 5 (1989) [Posner, Foreword], quoted in Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 1.
29

30

Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xxi.
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The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics

Contemporary law and economics is a discipline whose persuasion is built
from the application of scientific analyses—especially mathematics and the
quantitative analysis of empirical data—to social problems.31 Law is a discipline
that attempts to deal with social problems, and legal issues and the social
conditions created or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the law are problems or
conditions that may be subjected to economic analyses “with coherent theory,
precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of the
hypotheses.”32
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of legal rules on
behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or common sense concerning human
behavior.33 The theories are behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will
respond to laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.34 Legal economists
assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on the law because it has
mathematically precise theories (price theory and game theory) and empirically
sound methods (statistics and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39 (“Economics prides itself on its sciencelike
character, and economists on their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values,
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics] articles are 'written' in matrix
algebra, complex econometrics, formal lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics. They would be
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and techniques of advanced economics . . .
[T]he language of formalism and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably
'rhetorical.'”). See also Herbert M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting
Norms in the Courtroom, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42-43, 59 (2009).
31

32

Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5.

33

See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4.

34

See id. at 4.
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and sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively rational)
human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for individuals and for
society.35
D.

A Note about Levels of Rhetoric in Discourse

Before discussing the rhetorical canons of law and economics and their
application to general legal discourse, I must pause to explain a rhetorical concept
concerning levels of rhetoric. Rhetoric, in the most complete sense, is the study of
effective communication.36 Effectiveness in communication is determined by the
audience and the situation.37 There can be multiple audiences that receive a
communication, some are direct targets within the conception and understanding of
the author in preparing the discourse, and others are indirect receivers of the
discourse. The level of communication, and thus the level of rhetoric, applied to the
different audiences is not the same—not every audience will receive, decode, and
draw meaning from the communication at the same level of understanding.
Building on the work of Wayne C. Booth, the late professor and a leading
rhetorician from the University of Chicago (but not of the “Chicago School” of
economics), I will explain the three levels of rhetorical persuasion:

See id. at 3, 4, 5. See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 (4th ed. 2007) [Harrison,
Law and Economics]; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59.

35

White, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 695; Gadamer, Expressive Power of Language, supra n.14,
at 348; Mootz, supra n.14, at 317.
36

Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra n.17, at 1546; Robbins-Tiscione, Rhetoric For Legal
Writers, supra n.17, at 9; Makay, Speaking with an Audience, supra n.17, at 9.

37
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Level 1 Rhetoric – Understanding of the Members of Discipline
Level 1 rhetoric (rhetoric-1) is true understanding and acceptance of the
truth of the discourse by members of the discipline in which the discourse occurs,
who are schooled and knowledgeable in the disciple and its theories. This level of
understanding is reserved to experts in the field.38
Level 2 Rhetoric – Acceptance of the Persuasiveness of the Discourse by
Understanding the Reliability of the Support
Level 2 rhetoric (rhetoric-2) is not a complete understanding of the discourse
such as the understanding of members of the discipline of the discourse; the
audiences for rhetoric-2 are receivers or decision-makers who do not completely
understand the doctrine and theories of the discipline of the discourse. However,
level 2 reception of the discourse allows for the audience to accept the indicia of
truth and reliability of the discourse based on an understanding of the reliability of
the sources supporting the discourse that are used in the discourse39—scientific
results, scholarly sources, accepted forms of evidence, works with known
reputations—or the reliability of sources external to the discourse that support the
discourse—the character and testimony of trusted recommenders and the
observation of peer-acceptance of the work and the author by members of the same
38

See Booth, Idea of University, supra n. 22, at 12.

See Wayne C. Booth, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT xiii, 112 & n.19 (1974). See
also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological
Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1128 &
n.44, 1156 & n.170, 1161-62 (2008) (quoting Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of
Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49
39

HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1143-44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the
elegant form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert testimony, even that based on natural
or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique context—the law ....”)).
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discipline who presumably have rhetoric-1 understanding of the material in the
discourse.40 The acceptance of the reliability of the supporting sources allows for
persuasion of the truth and reliability of the discourse even without fully
understanding the discourse.41
Level 3 Rhetoric – Persuasion by the Internal Consistency and
Methodology
Methodology of the Discourse
The third level of rhetoric (rhetoric-3) again is one in which the audience of
decision-makers does not completely understand the truth of the discipline and its
theories, but the audience observes the internal consistency and logic and how the
discourse tracks under the evaluation of the design and execution of the
discourse42—an evaluation that asks questions such as: Do the methods used
appear to be sound, does the author appear to be competent in employing them, and
is the end product logical and internally consistent?43 An example would be the
evaluation of a scholarly journal article to determine if the author appears to be
competent and the writing consistent with the standards for scholarly inquiry and
40

Booth, Idea of University, supra n.22, at 12-13.

Id. Professor Ellen P. Goodman, in Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83,
115 (2006), describes the communication theory of Jürgen Habermas that depends upon the
existence of communicative action in discourse to “reach understanding” or “communicatively
achieved agreement.” 1 Jürgen Habermas, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 42, 286-87, 305
(orig. ed. 1981; Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Communicative action persuades by using a set of
“validity claims.” Id. at 75, 308. News reporting of world events may make a “constative” utterance
whose claim to validity is truth. Id. at 309, 323. Storytelling and narrative reasoning may be
considered “expressive” utterances whose claim to validity which is rooted in nothing more than
sincerity. Id. at 174, 325-26. “Regulative” utterances have a claim to validity of “rightness.” Id.
Participants to communicative action can either accept these validity claims or subject them to
criticism and demand justification. Id. at 99.
41

42

Booth, Idea of University, supra n.22, at 13-14.

43

See id.
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discourse within the academy or within one institution, such as a university, as a
whole.44 Another rhetorical way of understanding this level of rhetoric is whether
the author displays the proper ethos of her role in the creation of the discourse.45
In making recommendations for legal discourse based on the rhetoric of law
and economics, I will mention the level of rhetoric of the device employed. In many
instances, it will not be rhetoric-1 discourse, that which an economist would aim to
achieve when communicating with other economists, and law and economics
scholars would aim to achieve when communicating with other law and economics
scholars. In most cases, the rhetorical devices described here will be modes of

44

Id.

Ethos embodies both moral and intellectual qualities. Jakob Wisse, ETHOS AND PATHOS FROM
ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 30 (1989). While virtue and high moral character obviously are concepts
relating to the advocate’s ethics and morality, the concept of practical wisdom suggests that the
audience must perceive the advocate’s reasoning as sound, not simply from a formal logical
standpoint but in a broader sense of perceiving that the advocate possesses credibility and common
sense. Rhetoric, Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; Wisse, supra, at 30. The concept of good will indicates that
the advocate should evince good will and benevolence toward the audience as opposed to a spirit of
malice revealed through attempted deception, obfuscation, or self-aggrandizement. Rhetoric, Book
II, ch. 1 at 1378a; Wisse, supra, at 30-33; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72-73. Classical rhetoric
focused as much on projecting the right moral character as in possessing it. Michael Frost, Ethos,
Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85, 100-01 (1994) [Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience]; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72; Wisse, supra, at 31. “[A] person seeming to have
all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers.” Rhetoric, Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a
(emphasis added). Good moral character can be projected through the discourse itself; it is not
necessary that the advocate possess a widely-known reputation for uprightness and good moral
character when entering into the proceedings or that the advocate self-consciously point out aspects
and examples of his own good character in the discourse (although those means are recognized as
being available to the advocate in proper circumstances if handled with appropriate delicacy). See
Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra, at 100-101; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72-73.
The ethical appeal has particular importance in legal discourse because the modes of persuasion
through enthymemes and examples present arguments based on probability not certainty of proof.
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 72. Thus, it matters dearly when the audience weighs the
persuasiveness of arguments and counter-arguments based on probability that the audience perceive
the advocate as credible and believable, “possessing genuine wisdom and excellence of character.”
Id. (quoting 3 Quintilian, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 7, sec. viii at 13). The slightest lapse in
good sense, good will, or moral integrity might turn the audience away from acceptance of the
arguments. Id. at 73.
45

Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law

Page 18 of 83

persuasion at the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 level of persuasion—persuasiveness
based on the reliability of the support demonstrated in the rhetoric or
persuasiveness based on the internal logic and methodology—in short, the ethos—of
the discourse.

II.

The Rhetorical Canons of Law
Law and Economics
Economics
A.

The Four Canons

If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, then what is the rhetorical
nature of this discipline when used as a rhetorical lens in the law? I start with my
summary of the rhetoric of the discipline introduced earlier: Economics combines
mathematically precise theories and empirically sound methods of analyzing the
effects of incentives and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to achieve
efficient results for individuals and for society.46 From this, I derive the four canons
of law and economics rhetoric:
Mathematics and Science
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration47

See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4, 5. The rhetorician James Boyd White channeled the
rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the legal system in the following way: “The
overriding metaphor is that of the machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as
the attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White, Rhetoric and
Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES:
LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds.,
1987) [White, Rhetoric and Law] (quoted in Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19,
at 114).
46

47

Discussed in subsection 1 of this section.
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Incentives and Costs
The characterization of law and the legal system in the language of
incentives and costs 48
Efficiency
The rhetorical
rhetorical economic concept of efficiency49

Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral
social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science50

Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as topics of invention
and arrangement and tropes of style in persuasive discourse. The canons represent
the fundamental assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and design and
according to which theses concerning law and economics will be accepted as reliable
and authoritative by the members of the law and economics discipline51—in other

48

Discussed in subsection 2 of this section.

49

Discussed in subsection 3 of this section.

50

Discussed in subsection 4 of this section.

The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and varied, but for general
reference, see Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 3-4, 9, 13, 21, 24-25, 495-96; Cooter &
Ulen, supra n.27, at 2, 3, 4, 5, 41-43; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after
Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); and the sources cited in subsections 1-4 of this
section.
51
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words, by the members of the law and economics discourse community.52 Therefore,
these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law and economics.

1.

The Primacy of Mathematical
Mathematical and Scientific Methods of Analysis and
Demonstration

The practitioners of law and economics—those who follow the conventional
and the contemporary approaches—rely on the inherent persuasiveness of
mathematics and the methodologies of scientific proof both as a method of analysis
and a form for the demonstration53 of the analysis.54 Members of the economic

Discourse community being a term that grounds this discussion as to the rhetoric of law and
economics. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV. 395, 419-38 (1995) (economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The
Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing the
discourse of law and economics).
52

Demonstration and dialectic are the two principle forms of reasoning recognized by Aristotle. See
Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Book I, ch. 1 at 1354a; George A. Kennedy, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS
CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 80 (1999) [Kennedy, Classical
Rhetoric]. See also P. Christopher Smith, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT:
DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC (1998). Rhetoric is the form of demonstration used in
argumentative persuasion or “continuous discourse,” whereas dialectic is more appropriate to debate.
Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, supra at 66. Demonstration provides the rhetorical process of
arrangement with two paradigms of deductive reasoning, sullogismos (syllogisms) and enthumema
(enthymemes), Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 38-60; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, supra, at 8384; Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2002
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/
aristotle-rhetoric/> (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002), and two paradigms of
inductive reasoning, the induction and the example. See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book
53
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disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical, scientific deduction
and induction to prove propositions.55 The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive
forms) and the induction and example (inductive forms) are topoi of invention and
arrangement in science, mathematics, and rhetorical demonstration.56
Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical primacy of
scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, designing
the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, and
information collected to test the hypotheses.57 Law and economics also assumes the

I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733,
752 & n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the Development of
Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367, 372-73 (1999).

See Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27,
at 3, 4; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59;

54

George Pólya, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF MATHEMATICS AND
PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752,
760. The pros and cons of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is
growing in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009-10. E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith versus
Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443,
445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010).
55

The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the
structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See Aristotle, The
Rhetoric, Bk. I, Ch. 1, at 1355a. The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides
the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC,
and TREAT. Michael D. Murray & Christy H. DeSanctis, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7
(2009) (discussing IRAC and TREAT); Linda H. Edwards, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND
ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and
persuasive discourse); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 484-87, 492 (2003) [Robbins, Paradigm Lost]
(discussing IRAC and IREAC); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism:
Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006)
(discussing IRAC and IREAC).
56

See Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 15-16;
Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies—An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
437, 437 (1972). See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law,
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493
(1998); Gary Minda, supra n.52, at 611-12.
57
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rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to demonstrate
the analyses and communicate its theses about human behavior.58
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and prescriptions are
informed by scientific testing and mathematical analysis of data not just by logic,
intuition, common sense, ideology, or philosophy.59 The methods of examination
and the assumptions made that are supported by the rhetoric of contemporary law
and economics and law and behavioral science are those that are susceptible to
scientific proof through the application of mathematical and scientific methods of
analysis of empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses and assumptions about
human behavior in the context of the law.60 But the propositions chosen to be
proved, and especially the design of the experiments or studies that will be
adequate and reliable to prove the propositions, rely on rhetoric—the rhetoric being
that which is held within the disciplines to be reasonable, reliable, and provable
using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology.61

See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990));
Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).
58

59

E.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 3, 4, 5.

60

See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Louis Kaplow, et al., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372, 375-77

(2003).

Compare Anthony T. Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 678-79, 682 (1999), and John M.
Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems in
Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992), and Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On

61

Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of
Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992), with Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational
Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54,
61-63, 121-124 (1996) [Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises], and David R. Dow, Godel
and Langdell - A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal Theory, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 707 (1993), and Kevin W. Saunders, Realism, Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219
(1993).
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Mathematics is a language, and like any other language, is rhetorical.62
Mathematics is a wonderful tool of analysis, but the elevation of mathematical
forms and models as the primary method of demonstration in economic rhetoric
comes with a warning for the application of this trope in general legal discourse: it
is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and social condition can be subjected
to mathematical analysis.63 Albert Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of
mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain,
they do not refer to reality.”64
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral scientist has

proved, is inherently rhetorical in nature,65 and it is a powerfully persuasive word.
An assertion that something is proved or even can be proved is a rhetorical
assertion because even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions
that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.66 The differences in

See Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson, Probability and Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A
Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of Interdisciplinarity, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 447, 483-84 (2002); Donald
N. McCloskey, The Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase's The Nature Of The Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 425, 42526, 428-31 (1993); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (1987); Townsend, Implications of
Foundational Crises, supra n.61, at 62-63, 141; David N. Haynes, The Language and Logic of Law: A
Case Study, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 186-87, 220 (1981).
62

See generally Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?,
41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881, 889-90 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331-32 (1971); Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets
Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1379, 1383-84 (2010).
63

64

Albert Einstein, quoted in F. Capra, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 27 (1975).

65

McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752, 760.

See Susan K. Houser, Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1152
(1993); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136 n.3 (1992); Anthony D'Amato,
66
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opinions as to what are reasonable, reliable, and provable assumptions and
predictions in economics using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative
methodology has led to internal divisions within the law and economics community,
and led directly to the creation of the law and behavioral science discipline, as
discussed in subsection 4 below.
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms in law and economics—the use of
mathematics as a trope of arrangement and style in the demonstration—is to this
author the most intriguing aspect of this canon, and the most delicate topic from
which to draw prescriptions for legal discourse. The appearance of mathematical
certainty in law and economics rhetoric is an attractive tool, but is it too seductive?
Critics have challenged legal economists for adopting complex mathematical
formulae to demonstrate findings whose relevance to actual legal problems and
social conditions is said to be specious.67 Nevertheless, the a priori, ex ante,
positivist application of mathematical formulas to legal topics and problems has led
the practitioners of neoclassical law and economics to claim their greatest
successes.68

Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 597 (1989);
Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 956, 999 n.214 (1986); Steven P. Goldberg,
On Legal and Mathematical Reasoning, 22 JURIMETRICS 83, 87 n.26 (1981); Roy Stone, Affinities and
Antinomies in Jurisprudence, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281.
E.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485-90 (1987); Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy,
supra n.25, at 38; McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, supra n.23, at 44-45.
67

Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at xix (championing the unity, simplicity, and power,
but also the subtlety, of economic principles); Richard Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law:
A View from Economics, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 (1995); James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and
Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15
68
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I explained above that my purpose here is not to critique the benefits or costs
of the use of the canons of law and economics in the economic analysis of law. My
purpose is to explore the application of these rhetorical canons in legal discourse
generally. On the one hand, mathematics is a language, and thus rhetorical, and its
particular form of persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the open demonstration of
the truth and logic of its workings.69 On the other hand, mathematical forms of
demonstration may be employed to attempt to overcome “the difference between
truth in mathematics and truth in law—between logical truths and rhetorical or
dialectical or polemical truths”70—by cloaking the legal discourse in the rhetorical
garb of mathematics71 and science,72 making the findings appear to be more certain

L. & HIST. REV. 275, 287-88 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have enabled neoclassical
economics and public choice theory to describe both private and public markets by means of
mathematical models that have great elegance and rhetorical power.").

See McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 761, 763; Schmidt, supra n.53,
at 395-96; Kronman, supra n.61, at 679.

69

See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 604 (1983) (citing two of the most influential modern rhetoricians, Kenneth Burke, Politics as
Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 45, 46-47 (1982); and Chaim Perelman, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS
ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 120-74 (1980); Chaim Perelman, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE
HUMANITIES 1-61, 117-33 (1979)). The difference between formal logic and the absolute proof of the
syllogism, and informal logic used in everyday discourse to assert the most probable arguments in
everyday situations, is one of the primary impetuses that motivated the move to contemporary
schools of rhetoric building on the work of Burke and Perelman. See also Burke, A Grammar of
Motives, supra n.19; Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, supra n.19; Perelman, Realm of Rhetoric, supra
n.19; Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, supra n.19. Pigou, one of the forefathers of
neoclassical law and economics, pointed out the distinction between formal logic and pure
mathematics on the one side and the "realistic sciences" on the other, as to which economics was to
be a realistic science. A. C. Pigou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) (“On the one side
are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function it is to discover implications.
On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as physics, chemistry and biology, which are
concerned with actualities.”).
70

E.g., McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 753-54; James R. Hackney, Jr.,
UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY
(2007); Joseph Vining, The Gift of Language, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1583-84 (1998). See also
71
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and absolute than they really are. This possibility sends a significant message of
caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific forms in general
legal discourse.
With what I hope is appropriate caution dictated by this discussion, in section
III(A), I will describe the canon of mathematics and science in: (1) rhetoric-1-2-3
uses of mathematical scientific forms as a topic of invention and arrangement
(mathematical and logical structures and modeling of information) at all three
levels of rhetorical persuasion; and (2) rhetoric-3 uses of mathematical and scientific
forms as a trope of style (mathematical structures and forms used as a metaphor to
stimulate thinking and imagination).73

Gary Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4; Dan Ariely, George
Loewenstein, & Drazan Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable
Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73-106 (2003) (demonstrating how the illusion of stable, ordered
preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors).
McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, supra n.4, at 147; Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics:
Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 478-81 (1974). The excessively persuasive
72

effect of scientific demonstration is a problem in non-economic legal settings, too, such as evidence
law. See, e.g., Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE § 7.8, at 992 (1995) (“Scientific proof may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay factfinders,
especially if it comes dressed up in technical jargon, complicated mathematical or statistical
analysis, or involves a magic machine (‘black box’) that may seem to promise more than it delivers”);
John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by
Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 n.81 (1992) (“There is virtual
unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be ‘scientific’ in
nature will have particularly persuasive effect.”). See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific evidence “assume[s] a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a
jury of laymen”); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing scientific
testimony's “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”). But see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the

Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993) (jurors are able to evaluate
competing scientific and technical testimony).
Michael I. Meyerson, Mathematics and the Legal Imagination: A Response to Edelman, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 477, 478 (2002) ("mathematics can trigger a non-mathematical imagination and create
mental images that permit new ways of thinking about non-mathematical topics").
73
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The characterization
characterization of law and the legal system in the language
of incentives and costs

The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and economics begins with
a seminal insight of economics: that people respond to incentives74 and that the law
(legal rules and the legal system) can create incentives that can influence human
behavior in one direction and can create disincentives that can influence human
behavior in the other direction.75 Legal rules and the legal system can “encourage
socially desirable conduct and discourage undesirable conduct” by rewarding or
subsidizing certain behavior and punishing or taxing other behavior.76 Legal rules
and the legal system can increase the costs of certain behavior or lesson the costs of
other behavior.77
The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical;78 it is both an
assumption and a presumption that shapes the predictions that analysts using the

Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054; Yuval Feldman & Doron
Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 987 (2009).
74

See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
405, 412-14 (2005); Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1127,
1132 (1991); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1043.
75

Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054. See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence
Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 343-47 (1989);
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 164-65 (1996); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation:
Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711 (2008).
76

Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 84; Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science, supra n.5, at 1054; Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions
and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 284-86 (1998); Peter Reuter, A Just Use of
Economics or Just Use Economics, 70 CAL. L. REV. 850, 853-54 (1982).
77

See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197
(1996) (discussing the rhetoric of incentives in copyright law); Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (same).
78
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methodology of law and economics can make about the effects of law and the
recommendations that these analysts are willing to make about changes to the
law.79 Law and economics imported this assumption from economics, along with the
assumption that people react rationally to incentives.80
Economists’ examination of human behavior within various legal and social
environments of the world involves the characterization of many phenomena as
either incentives or costs.81 The canon of incentives and costs states that humans
and human institutions facing a choice in conditions of scarce resources (thus
requiring a choice) will act in ways that achieve or realize (maximize) the incentives
and avoid (minimize) the costs.82 When the actor under examination is government,
the rhetoric of the discipline defines the benefits and rewards offered or imposed by
government as incentives and the costs imposed or perpetuated by government as
taxes or externalities.83 When the actors under examination are private parties, the

See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1795-96 & nn.42-44 (2003) (discussing “overadvocacy” of legal
incentives); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054.
79

George Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 1982 REGULATION 13-16 (May-June 1982); Russell
Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781, 795
(2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054.
80

See Balganesh, supra n.78, at 1591-92; Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal
Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589-92
(2008); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1141-42, 1198-99 (2001); Korobkin &
Ulen, supra n.5, at 1058.
81

Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral
Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 448-49 (2004); Philip B. Heymann, The Problem
of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L. REV. 797, 829-30, 848-49 (1973); Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 4.
82

See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J.
1447, 1463-64 (1991); W. Keller, TAX INCIDENCE: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH (1980); Richard
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rhetoric of the discipline defines incentives and costs in economic terms such as
offers, inducements, price, or rent.84 The presumption is that human actions are
motivated to alter their behavior in response to incentives and costs.85
The language of economics—cost, benefit, incentives, disincentives,
externalities, and economics—already is widely embraced in the law. Courts and
scholars alike have widely embraced the language of incentives and costs in their
discussions of law and legal analysis as part of the general acceptance of economic
considerations in legal analysis, as suggested by the following chart:

A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1982);
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 22.
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:
An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 492-94 (1988); Joseph F. Brodley &
Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1167-68 (1993); Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
589, 600-01 (2005); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of
Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological” Account, and Some Illustrative
Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327, 329-30 & n.3 (1993).
84

George Stigler, supra n.80, at 13-16; Korobkin, supra n.80, at 781, 795; Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law, supra n.2, at 4.
85
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Cases or Articles
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ALLFEDS
ALLSTATES
JLR
BRIEFS
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2093
924
10,000+
536

186
88
1447
58

170
86
10,000+
43
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Cases or
Articles using
the term
“economic(s)”
with “law” or
“analysis”91

4303
1935
10,000+
1014

This chart (a taxonomy, an economic-friendly demonstration of data—a topos
of arrangement or trope of style) indicates that the language (i.e., the rhetoric) of
costs and incentives is fairly common in legal analysis among courts and in legal
scholarship. Legal authors—judges, scholars, and practitioners—already are
employing incentives and costs language in substantive legal discourse with
significant frequency. Every time an author writes about a cost-benefit analysis,
every time a change in the law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct, every time a
license or permit application process is said to provide a disincentive to an activity,
every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an “externality” on the

Westlaw database for all federal cases since 1945, all state cases since 1945, all journals and law
review articles, and appellate briefs filed in ten state courts of appeals (Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin) with
coverage of appellate briefs ranging by state; the earliest coverage is 1991-present (Washington) and
the latest is 2006-present (Arizona).

86

87

Westlaw search terms used: cost /2 benefit.

88

Westlaw search terms used: incentive /5 law legal government.

89

Westlaw search terms used: disincentive /5 law legal government.

90

Westlaw search terms used: externalit!

91

Westlaw search terms used: economic /2 law analysis

92

Entries marked 10,000+ indicate search results exceeding 10,000 documents (articles).
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cost of litigation, the author uses a rhetorical trope of style (a figure of speech) to
discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not
necessarily business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of
pecuniary sums or damages.93
The basic statement that humans respond favorably to incentives and not
favorably to costs disguises the rhetorical complexity of this presumption when it
comes to making predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in
response to legal conditions. First, incentives or costs must be designed,
communicated, and recognized by human actor or institution; government must
correctly design and communicate its actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the
tax that government intends to offer to or impose on its audience of citizens, and
private actors must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to offer the
correct intended inducement or impose the intended price or rent.94 Second, and
equally important to the rhetoric of the discipline, is the fact that the action must be
perceived and understood by the human audience, the object or recipient of

In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the
calculation of damages in almost every area of law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the
substantive elements of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages.
In addition, at the level of rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for
persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical
and quantitative analyses of empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant
tabular presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion. In both categories, the
direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of
evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language to convince the reader of the
evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is rhetorical. See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra n.19,
at 118-21; Thomas Conley, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Fred A. Simpson &
Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts—Aristotle and the Rules of Evidence, 34
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003).
93

94

See subsection 4 infra.
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government’s or a private actor’s action, and what should be perceived and
understood as an incentive as opposed to a cost is not always a simple process for
humans.95
The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is most closely associated with the
canon of rational choice: the design, communication, perception, and motivation
concerning incentives and costs requires analysis and an understanding of the
rhetorical audience and the rhetorical situation.96 Scientific empirical analysis of
human behavior indicates that there are limitations on humans’ abilities to
understand and appreciate benefits and costs.97 These limitations are assumed and
represented in the rhetorical statement that humans are creatures of “bounded”
abilities – bounded rationality, bounded ability to gather information, bounded
perception, and bounded cognition. These bounds limit humans’ abilities to
perceive and understand the incentives and costs set before them, which in turn
complicates the predictions and prescriptions of economists regarding the

95

See subsection 4 infra.

When is a situation “rhetorical”? —When the audience of the message in the situation has the
opportunity to alter reality. When the audience has no choice, the situation is not rhetorical. A
situation is made up of: subject—place—time—audience—speaker. See Bitzer, The Rhetorical
Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80.
96

E.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640 (1999) [Hanson & Kysar]; Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler, supra n.5, at 1471;
Symposium: The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669
(1996); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1998).
97
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motivational effect of incentives and costs. This is the rhetorical “audience”
consideration with incentives and costs.
Separately, there is the mounting scientific empirical evidence of the social,
cognitive, and brain sciences that indicates that humans are situational decisionmakers.98 A consideration of the rhetorical problems of audience and situation are
commonplace in rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric in particular has covered this
ground well.99
Section III(B) will describe the canon of incentives and costs in: (1) rhetoric-3
uses of incentives and costs as a trope of style (i.e., a figure of speech using
incentives and costs as a metaphor in discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric3 concept of organization and presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention
and arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse and whether
it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).

See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational
Character, supra n.2; Hanson & Kysar, supra n.102, at 640.
98

E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.14, at 695 (“Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it
invents out of something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation,
about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and speaking a particular language.
Rhetoric always takes place with given materials.”); Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at
6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80.
The contemporary analysis of communication produces a formula for the speaker’s invention of
discourse crafted for a given situation: Exigence (a/k/a the rhetorical problem, the reason for
speaking, and the urgency thereof) + Audience (mediators of change—those who may be moved from
one point to another in the situation) + Constraints (the physical or psychological limitations or
opportunities of the situation) = Fitting response (the speaker’s purpose and objectives). See Bitzer,
The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 390-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80. This model
easily can be applied to economic analysis—if the object of the incentive has no choice, then there is
no opportunity for theorizing rational choice of incentives in that situation.
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The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency

There are two kinds of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and economics:
(1) formal efficiency as a preference for simple, elegant formulae and solutions
(Rhetoric-3 Efficiency), and (2) the substantive economic concepts of efficiency as a
standard and goal of law and policy (Rhetoric-1 and Rhetoric-2 Efficiency). Both
modes employ a highly rhetorical turn. The adoption and application of the
rhetorical primacy of science and mathematics carries other implications for the
discipline, including, for example, that a more efficient (elegant) solution to a
problem is preferred under the rhetoric of mathematics and science and
subsequently under the rhetoric of economics and the rhetoric of law and
economics.100 The formal desire for efficiency in structure and form leads to a
rhetoric-3 level of priority for elegance and simplicity in the equations and formulae
of the discipline.101 Naturally, elegant and effective formulae that are substantively
correct make an important impact on the rhetoric-1 level of understanding of
economists, but I describe this mode as offering rhetoric-3 persuasion because noneconomists can appreciate the persuasiveness of an elegant formula and simple
solution because this mode of presentation promotes clarity and openness, revealing
the workings and falsifiability of the reasoning.

“Mathematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in the realm of law, that
combines logic with human experience, a mere afterthought.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science, supra n.5, at 1054.
100

See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 4,
5 (1994); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 16.
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In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and advocates efficiency
over more abstract concepts of fairness, morality, and justice.102 This is not to say
that fairness, morality, and justice are never incorporated into an economic
analysis, but that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts into the
rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency—in other words, assuming for purposes of
a model or prescription that a fair, moral, and just solution will be more efficient
according to one of the economic conceptions of efficiency.103 Efficiency (or
parsimony) in the rhetoric of law and economics is not just a formal imperative for
methods and procedures of modeling paradigms and the formulation of hypotheses
and theses, but it also has been advanced as a substantive and instrumental
imperative in positive examination of conditions, normative analysis of possible
conditions, and prescriptions for future conditions.104 Efficiency, therefore, has
become a rhetorical imperative in and of itself in law and economics.105

E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What can be Gained by
Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1998) [Korobkin & Ulen, Efficiency and

102

Equity].

See, e.g., Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The
Integration of Fairness Into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 284-86, 316-17 (1998); Henrik Lando,
An Attempt to Incorporate Fairness into an Economic Model of Tort Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
575 (1997); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative Law and Economics, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157 (1994). See generally Ken Binmore, PLAYING FAIR: GAME
103

THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1994); Ken Binmore, JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1998); Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996); Hervé Moulin, COOPERATIVE MICROECONOMICS: A GAME-THEORETIC
INTRODUCTION 3, 8 (1995); H. Peyton Young, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (1994).

See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 13-16; Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 3-6 (1993); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward
a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 345-46 (1984); Robert D. Cooter, Law
104

and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of
the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1260, 1263 (1982) (“A process is efficient when it yields the
maximum output from given input, or equivalently, when it yields a given output with the minimum
input.”); Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI.
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The elevation of efficiency over other concepts associated with the law, such
as fairness, morality, and justice, makes the work of law and economics simpler and
easier in many ways,106 but more difficult in other ways.107 The substantive
meaning of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and economics is a clever twist on a
common word to add a very specific, and nonintuitive meaning for efficiency in law
and economics—and not just one meaning. In the rhetoric of economics, substantive
and instrumental “efficiency” is defined in three, carefully crafted ways: productive

efficiency (sometime referred to by the undistinguishing term of economic
efficiency), in which a process or action produces the intended result with maximum
utility and minimum costs;108 Pareto efficiency 109 (allocative efficiency), in which

L. REV. 307, 309 (1979) [Michelman, Comment]; Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1032-35 (1978) [Michelman, Norms].
“Although efficiency need not be the sole or primary goal of legal policy, economic analysis of law
teaches that policymakers ignore the efficiency implications of their actions at society's peril. Legal
rights that are unobjectionable in the abstract are not free but rather must be measured against
their opportunity costs.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1054 (inner
citations omitted).
105

Cass R. Sunstein, On Philosophy and Economics, 19 QUINN. L. REV. 333, 335-36, 348 (2000); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-4, 9-10 (2d ed. 1989) [Polinsky, Law
and Economics]; Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
281, 301 (1979).
106

E.g., Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, supra n.5, at 1508-09 (“laws may be efficient solutions to the
problems of organizing society . . . [but] [t]he notion that laws emerge from considerations of
efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most citizens as odd. . . . many laws
on the books appear to be difficult to justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit
mutually beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to benefit groups that do not
have much lobbying power (such as the poor or middle class)”).
107

R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A
Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679, 690-91 (2000); Joseph F. Brodley, The
Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1028-29 (1987). See also Walter Nicholson, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 611-20 (9th ed. 2004); Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 17.
108
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the situation cannot be altered to benefit one of the parties in the situation without
making the other party worse off—better or worse off referring to the individual,
subjective perceptions and preferences of the parties;110 and potential Pareto

improvements or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, in which incremental gains in benefits or
incentives created by a change in action exceed incremental losses or costs imposed
by the change in action.111
The language of efficiency is intended to facilitate rhetoric-1 level
communication within the economics discourse community and rhetoric-2 level
communication to facilitate the advocacy of the discipline to the outside world.
Within the discipline, the rhetoric of law and economics assumes that it is easier to
conceive of models of efficiency and form hypotheses of efficiency and to test these
models and hypotheses of efficiency through scientific and mathematical methods of
analysis than it would be to test fairness, morality, and justice using scientific and
mathematical analyses. As rhetoric-2 discourse, the models and forms that are
developed give the appearance of rigorous scientific analysis that “proves” the
hypotheses that a certain course or change in law produces efficient results,

See Vilfredo Pareto, 4 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF SOCIETY 1459, 1465-69
(1907) (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907); Vilfredo Pareto, MANUAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1906) (Ann. S. Schwier trans., 1971); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 12.

109

See Polinsky, Law and Economics, supra n.111, at 7 n. 4; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,
supra n.2, at 13, 14, 26; Richard A. Posner, The Ethical & Political Bases of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491 (1980); Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 17;
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Jules
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980). See also Hal R. Varian, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160-71 (3d ed.
110

1992); Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 103-10, 433-35 (8th ed. 1920); Arthur Cecil Pigou,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 31-43 (1952).
111

See Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 18.
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whichever of the three forms of “efficient” results are assumed in the models and
hypotheses.
The success or failure of models and hypotheses concerning one or more of the
economic definitions of efficiency is easier to observe through scientific and
mathematical methods of analysis of statistics and econometric data than it would
be to test a model or hypothesis of fairness, morality, or justice. Success or failure is
a highly desirable observation of any practical study, and models and hypotheses of
fairness, morality, and justice may suffer from the fact that they may be
tautological and non-falsifiable within the rhetorical definitions of fairness,
morality, and justice in the law, philosophy, or ethics. However, rational humans
embrace concepts of fairness, morality, and justice, and act on them, which
complicates economics predictions and prescriptions as to the effect of law and legal
conditions.
Therefore, Section III(C) will discuss the following prescriptions for legal
discourse: (1) rhetoric-1 substantive uses of the term efficiency that are employed
in the economic efficiency-sense where it is evident that simple avoidance of waste
and reduction in costs (transactional, collateral, or externalities) is a valued goal in
the area of law under analysis;112 (2) rhetoric-3 coding of language relevant to the
substantive analysis to emphasize efficiency—i.e., the framing, phrasing, and
defining of elements of the analysis in terms of efficiency in ways that are

Many areas of law are compatible with this goal, not just environmental law or contract law, but
careful consideration to preeminent considerations of justice and fairness, for example, in criminal
law, may dominate the rhetorical decision whether to advocate efficiency.
112
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persuasive and rhetorically valuable; (3) rhetoric-3 formal applications of
composition, arrangement, and style of legal discourse, elevating elegance and
efficiency in form, structure, and composition to benefit clarity and falsifiability.113
4.

The Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice
Choice

Law and economics presumes that human actors in legal situations are
rational and will act in rational ways in response to legal conditions. The early
adopters of the law and economics analysis of law accepted a rhetorical assumption
that when faced with choices, humans will respond rationally in making their
choices, rather than acting randomly, capriciously, and, most importantly for the
discipline of law and economics, predictably.114 The rhetoric of this position is
known generally as rational choice theory.115
Over the last five decades, rational choice theory employed by law and
economics analysts has produced marked success in explaining and predicting
human behavior when humans are confronted by incentives, costs, or opportunities,
and many of these successes have been applied to make accurate predictions of the
effect of existing laws or changes in the law on the behavior of humans subject to
the laws.116 The successes produced under the rational choice theory lead some to
argue that rational choice theory, defined broadly enough, and shaped to encompass
Formal applications of efficiency will benefit persuasion by promoting clarity and comprehension
of meaning over confusion and frustration. They also open doors to falsifiability—doors that are
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation. Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted
are highly persuasive.
113

114

See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra n.5, at 1055.

115

Id.

116

See id. at 1053-54.
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all areas where predictions are reliable and verifiable and to exclude the areas and
phenomenon where predictions are unreliable and refutable, is all that an economic
approach to the law requires.117 In fact, some argue that the “correction” applied to
economics by behavioral science—to reject many if not most of the assumptions
represented by the rational choice theory—means that a behavioral approach to law
and economics does not fit within the rhetoric of economics or law and economics at
all.118 They argue that analysts of behavioral science may be applying psychology,
or sociocultural, or cognitive theories to the law, but they are not applying
economics.119 This is indeed a crisis within the rhetoric of the discipline.
The definition of what it means to be “rational” in response to legal conditions
and the weight given to the presumption of rationality differs depending on the
legal situation that is being studied and the legal economist that is studying the
situation. Cognitive science has indicated that situations affect decision making in
ways that are contrary to traditional rational choice theory of maximizing self
interest.120 A large part of the correction in the rhetoric of traditional law and
economics advanced by the proponents of a behavioral approach to law and

Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1553-58 (1998) [Posner, Rational Choice].

117

Id. at 1558 (“If there is any theory in their approach, it is not an economic theory.”). See section C
infra.
118

Posner, Rational Choice, supra n.122, at 1558 (“They take a psychological approach to phenomena
that are sociological and psychological as much as they are economic, yet call their approach
economic. . . . [Their approach] would be easier to understand if it were offered to the reader as a
contribution to the psychological analysis of law rather than to the economic analysis of law.”).
119

See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational
Character, supra n.2.

120
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economics is a correction in the definition of rationality and the weight given to the
presumption of rationality in the face of various legal conditions.121 The behavioral
approach asserts that the definition of rationality and its weight in making
predictions about human behavior in the face of legal conditions must be modified
with the knowledge and understanding gained from behavioral science, which gives
a clearer picture of the nature and limits of human rationality in response to legal
situations.
The acceptance or at least the acknowledgement that rational choice is more
bounded than traditional rational choice theories and models have predicted
presents a problem for the rhetoric of the discipline and complexity in the use of
rational choice theory as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse. The rhetoric of the
discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of “rational” so as to incorporate
the empirical observations of seemingly non-traditional, irrational behavior in legal
situations requiring a choice.122 For example, in response to the ultimatum game
studies,123 “rational” as a definition may be modified from a strict position that one

“There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-and-economics communities
about precisely what rational choice theory is and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the
law-and-economics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a relatively weak, or thin,
presumption that individuals act to maximize their expected utility, however they define this, or as a
relatively strong, or thick, presumption that individuals act to maximize their self-interest.”
Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1055 (inner citations omitted).
121

In fact, it is only rational for law and economics scholars to attempt to preserve the theory of
rational choice by expanding the definition of “rational” as this will avoid throwing out the entire
canon of rational choice as an operative foundation for economic models, theories, and predictions.
122

Ultimatum game studies test the theory that when a person is assigned a sum and asked to offer
a portion of the sum to another person with the understanding that if the other person accepts the
offer, both will take away something—the offeror keeps the remainder of the sum not offered, and
the offeree keeps what was offered and accepted—but neither person will take away anything if the
offer is not accepted. Traditional rational choice theory predicted that a tiny sum would be offered
123
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will act to maximize selfish pecuniary interests to a broader definition that one will
act to maximize his or her own interests of whatever kind, one interest being the
motivation to be and to be perceived as being fair in bargaining.
Whether the rational choice theory is definitional (e.g., humans rationally
make choices to maximize their ends),124 or based on a conception that humans
make choices to maximize their expected utility from the choices made,125 or based
on an assumption of human self-interest,126 or humans’ motivation toward wealth
maximization,127 the consequences for legal discourse points to the same goal: that

because this maximizes the offeror’s pecuniary self interest, while allowing the offeree to take away
something, however small. The studies belied this prediction by observing that offerees routinely
rejected small offers, for example less than 20% of the sum, and offerors tended to offer much larger
sums, frequently in the range of 40-50% of the sum assigned. Theories arising from these empirical
data revolve around the concept of fairness and the parties’ perception of what is fair in the
situation—that offerees will not accept an offer that is perceived to be unfair even though any offer,
no matter how small, increased their pecuniary well being, and offerors offered a greater portion
with an apparent motivation of trying to be fair or at least to be perceived as being fair. This
prompts researchers to include fairness and the perception of fairness as factors in conceptions of
rational self interest. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of

Fairness Under Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for
Corporate Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within
Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435, 474-75 (2000);
Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1818-19 (2000); Richard
Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 33-39 (1999); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 433, 459.

See Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implications for Law and Public
Policy, 3 LEG. THEORY 23, 24 (1997); Korobkin & Ulen, at 1061.
124

See Donald P. Green & Ian Shapiro, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 (1994); Geoffrey Brennan, Comment, What Might
Rationality Fail to Do, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 51, 52 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi
eds., 1990); Scott Plous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 83 (1993); Korobkin
& Ulen, supra n.5, at 1062.

125

Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1765, 1766 (1998); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1986); Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1065.
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Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1066; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27, at 26; Polinsky, Law and
Economics, supra n.111, at 10.
127
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law should be communicated to people in a manner that maximizes the incentives
to the reader to accept and be persuaded by the legal communication, and
minimizes the costs imposed by the communication. In Section III(D), I will discuss
the rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice theory in three areas:
(1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to respond to biases and heuristics and to
situational conditions on rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement;
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and syllogistic
structure) to appeal to a rational audience; and (3) rhetoric-3 uses of metaphor,
parable/mythical/fable forms, character archetypes, and other forms of narrative
reasoning as tropes of style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other
heuristics and biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from modern
cognitive studies and brain science.
B.

The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics

Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a manner that
reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive exercise; all of the canons work
together and simultaneously to affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the
discipline or activity. Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of the
other canons, making them more or less persuasive. In classical rhetoric, the three
canons of invention (aspects of persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the
author or speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos,128 are often depicted as a

See Covino & Joliffe, supra n.16, at 17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Michael
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127 (1992)
[Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis]; Robin Smith, Aristotle's Logic, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2004 ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
128
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rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to another and the
combined impact on the recipient of the discourse:

With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse presents the
concept as a linear flow-chart129:

James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder – Signal – Decoder, linking the
author, the language or message, and the reader or audience to reality.130 The
author projects his ethos along with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos
of the message so as to influence the pathos of the audience.131
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.132 Aristotle sought to
remind advocates that an argument is not one-dimensional. The most logically
sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/> (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit Oct. 5, 2000)
[Smith, Aristotle’s Logic]; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 71-84; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric,
supra n.54, at 68, 75, 82, 89.
129

Wisse, supra n.45, at 8.

See James L. Kinneavy, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [Kinneavy,
Theory of Discourse]; Phelps, supra n.9, at 1091; Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The
Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000) [Berger,
Reflective Rhetorical Model].
130

131

Wisse, supra n.45, at 7-8.

See Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1728-29 (1995); Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 614, 624, 625, 627.

132
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constructed argument still will not persuade an audience if the audience questions
the knowledge, skill, or credibility of the author. Similarly, the most respected
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the day if her
argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes apart at the seams with a
single, gentle tug at one of its logical flaws. An ironclad argument may be delivered
in such a way as to antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and credibility of the
author.133
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact together at the same
time and toward the same audience. Proper economic discourse incorporates each
canon for the persuasion of the audience. There is a connection and interaction in
the discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion of the
audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of efficiency, mathematical and
scientific certainty, response to incentives, and even rational choice without
affecting the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse. An
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon puts the others at
risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience. As with classical rhetorical modes of
invention, the interaction of the canons of law and economics may be depicted
visually, although with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:

133

See generally Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra n.45; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11,

at 72-73.

Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law

Page 46 of 83

In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse (Speaker
Speaker)
Speaker codes the
discourse (Message
Message)
Audience)
Message for a particular receiver (Audience
Audience according to the conditions,
requirements, and limitations of the context of the discourse (Situation
Situation).
Situation In law and
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker’s
Speaker purpose is most closely aligned with
the canon of Efficiency,
fficiency the Message to achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the
language of Incentives and Costs
Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience
according to the Rational Choice Theory,
Theory and the means used are chosen in
reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct preference for the methods of
Mathematics and Science.
Science Therefore, I will realign the rhetorical diamond of the
canons of law and economics by depicting the flow of the discourse wherein each
canon feeds into and simultaneously draws from the other canons in alignment with
the components of modern argument theory:
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DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of
LAW AND ECONOMICS
INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

SPEAKER

INVENTION,
INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

SITUATION

MESSAGE

INVENTION,
INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

AUDIENCE

The diagram indicates the rhetorical modes I will discuss in Section III:

A.

Mathematics and Science used as Topics of Invention and
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style.

B.

Incentives and Costs used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and
as a Trope of Style.

C.

Efficiency used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and as a Trope
of Style.

D.

Rational Choice used as Topics of Invention and Arrangement and as a
Trope of Style.
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III
III. The Canons of Law and Economics as Rhetorical
Rhetorical
Perspectives in Law
A.

RhetoricRhetoric-1-2-3 uses of Mathematics and Science as Topics of Invention
and Arrangement and a Trope of Style

Rhetoric under the modern argument theory of contemporary rhetorical
theory is crafting discourse for the audience and the situation.134 Modern argument
theory confronts the problem of the indeterminacy of language.135 The linguistic
limitations of indeterminacy mean that arguments are not provable in the absolute
unless the language used, such as the language of mathematics and formal logic, is
determinate enough for absolute proof, at least “proof” within the language of that
discipline.136 Outside the realms of mathematics and formal logic, language is only
determinative of probabilities of meaning, so that when the discourse extends
beyond pure mathematics and formal logic, argumentation depends on the
construction of the most reasonable and probable argument that can be made in the
social situation or institutional setting.137 The argument is not offered as

See generally Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, supra n.19; Bitzer, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92;
Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8; Toulmin, supra n.19; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 875-80.
134

See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Bruner & Amsterdam, supra n.8, at chs. 2-3, 6-7;
Frans H. Van Eemeren et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Stephen Toulmin et al., AN
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning]; Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8.

135

See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning, supra n.140;
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8.
136

See Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139; Toulmin, Introduction to Reasoning, supra n.140;
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8.
137
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incontrovertible proof, but instead as the most reasonable and probable outcome
that can be advocated in the situation.138
Invention and arrangement are the canons that directly confront the
rhetorical problem of composing the language for a meaning and persuasion by the
audience in the situation:
Invention: Invention is the canon that describes the means to create, devise,
and conceive of persuasive discourse.139 The term invention is a translation of the
Latin inventio and carries the same meaning as the Greek term for invention or
discovery, heuristic (Ευρετική).140 The canon is divided into two parts, the modes of
argument and persuasion that are invented or created by the author—the entechnic

pisteis or “artistic” or “artificial” proofs known as logos, pathos, and ethos141—and
the modes of argument and persuasion that the author does not or cannot invent,
but that are discovered or found—the atechnic pisteis or “non-artistic” or “nonartificial” proofs, including facts and data, statistics and reports, documents and
See generally Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, supra n.8; Toulmin, supra n.140. In the legal
arena, this theory accepts that fact that the advocate has a client whose facts and legal situation are
not necessarily the best possible circumstances for a person legally to be involved in; nevertheless,
the advocate must offer the most reasonable, probable, and compelling argument in support of his or
her client's position that can be raised in the situation, with the hope that the decision-maker will
find the argument more reasonable and compelling than the opponent's arguments. Smith, Rhetoric
Theory, supra n.8, at 139 (citing Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J.
LEG. EDUC. 566, 567 (1994)).
138

Frost, Lost Heritage, at 617; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of
Invention, 66 St. John’s L. Rev. 107, 110 (1992) [Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis].
139

See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 48; http://howtosay.org/en_el/Heuristic (last accessed
Jan. 2, 2011). “Heureka,” a/k/a, “eureka” is, “I have found (it),” the first person, singular, perfect
active indicative form of heuriskein, the Greek verb “to find.” See http://wordinfo.info/unit/
781?letter=E&spage=6 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011).

140

See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, Introduction to Logos, Pathos, and Ethos, in Advanced Legal Writing,
supra n.12, at 10-25.

141
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contracts, sworn testimony (including expert testimony), interviews, polls, and
surveys.142
The canon of invention serves as a reminder to authors of legal discourse to
consider the available means of persuasion and the interaction of the modes chosen
so as not to leave out available means or employ self-contradictory or self-defeating
means. The classical rhetoricians did not consider this canon to be a list of required
elements of argument.143 Ideally, using the classical rhetorical canon of invention,
the discourse should be crafted to persuade through logos,144 a logical exposition of
the argument, as well as by revealing the competence and integrity of the author to
handle the exposition itself (ethos),145 and inspire emotions that put the audience in
a frame of mind to be persuaded by the argument (pathos),146 by using the nonartificial facts and evidence made available by the rhetorical situation.
Classical rhetoric follows three paths simultaneously toward the goal of
persuasion: ethos (persuasion accomplished through the perceived character or
reputation of the speaker),147 pathos (persuasion accomplished through the

See Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley,
RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011.
142

143

See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133,

at 127.
144

See Smith, Aristotle's Logic, supra n.133.

Covino & Joliffe, supra n.16, at 52; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 71-77; Kennedy, Classical
Rhetoric, supra n.54, at 68, 75.
145

Covino & Joliffe supra n.16, at 17; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 77-84; Kennedy, Classical
Rhetoric, supra n.54, at 82, 89.

146

147

Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356.
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emotional response of the audience to the communication),148 and logos (persuasion
accomplished through logical reasoning embodied in the content of the
communication).149 The interaction of the three means of persuasion may be
depicted as a “rhetorical triangle” similar to the “communication triangle” discussed
in contemporary rhetorical theory150 (see diagram below):

In this conceptualization, the three paths of persuasion flow into one another:
the logos of the argument affects the pathos in the audience and simultaneously
affects the perception of the ethos of the author; the pathos of the audience
members affects how they perceive the ethos of the author and how they receive the
logos of the argument.

148

Id.

149

Id.

Univ. of Iowa Rhetoric Dep’t, The Rhetorical Triangle: Logos, Ethos and Pathos, MORPHING
TEXTBOOK~RHETORIC TOOLS at http://www.uiowa.edu/~rhetoric/morphing_textbook/
general/triangle.html (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010); see also Levine & Saunders, supra n.19, at 11415; Kinneavy, Theory of Discourse, supra n.135, at 19; Phelps, supra n.9, at 1091-93.
150

Law and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law

Page 52 of 83

Arrangement: The classical rhetorical canon of arrangement (Latin

dispositio; Greek taxis) pertains to the order and design of the discourse for
persuasive effect.151 Arrangement is context and purpose driven—the proper and
persuasive arrangement of discourse depends on the speaker, the speaker’s purpose,
the setting or situation, the characteristics of the speaker’s audience, and the
audience’s purpose, desires, or motivation.152 As a starting point, the classical
rhetoricians developed a complex paradigm for arguments that still is applied in
court rules153 for trial and appellate briefs: Exordium (introduction or statement of
the issues presented), Narratio (statement of the case), Partitio (summary of the
argument), Confirmatio (argument), and Peroratio (conclusion).154
As with the other canons of rhetoric, arrangement was considered to be of
high importance to the persuasiveness of the discourse. Sloppy, disorderly, or
impenetrable arrangements defeat access to the demonstration of the workings of
the argument, deny falsifiability, distract the audience’s attention from the
See Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 256-92; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50;
Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-19; Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 18289.
151

See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50; Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 256-92;
Michael H. Frost, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC 4, 34, 35 (2005) [Frost, Classical
Legal Rhetoric].
152

E.g., U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules 14, 24; see Frost, Classical Legal Rhetoric, supra n.157, at 45;
Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 50.
153

See Frost, Classical Legal Rhetoric, supra n.157, at 45. The dispositio of the argument also may
contain refutatio, the making and meeting of counter-arguments. In De Inventione, Cicero named
six parts: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio (refutation, counter-argumentation),
and conclusio (conclusion). Cicero, De Inventione, supra n.18, at 1.19. The Rhetorica ad Herennium
names six parts of dispositio: exordium, narratio, divisio (summary, breakdown of arguments),
confirmatio, confutatio (counter-argumentation), and conclusio. RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM § 1.3 (H.
Caplan trans., Harv. U. Press 1954). See Russ VerSteeg & Nina Barclay, Rhetoric and Law in Ovid's
Orpheus, 15 L. & LIT. 395, 409-10 & n.71, 413 (2003).
154
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communication of the discourse, and deflate the audience’s reception and reaction to
the argument. All of this prevents persuasion.
1.

The entechnic pisteis (artistic) modes of Logos in Mathematical
and Scientific methods of Invention and Arrangement

Mathematics and science already tread the logos pathway to persuasive
discourse through the logical deductive structure of the syllogism155 and the logical
inductive structure of the induction.156 The same forms may be used in invention
and arrangement in rhetoric to construct meaning and respond to the expectations
of the legal writing discourse community.157

Deductive reasoning is the process of formation of a major premise or general proposition and
moving to the analysis of a minor premise or specific proposition so as to draw a conclusion. Frost,
Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 118; Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra n.56, at 492-93
(2003); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation–Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of
Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1993). Aristotle characterized all forms of
deductive reasoning as belonging to the topic of syllogisms. See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18,
at Book I, ch. 1 at 1356. In a legal argument, a legal rule—a statement of the legal principles that
govern a general set of circumstances—is applied to a new situation—a specific set of facts—to
produce a conclusion about the outcome of this application. Murray & DeSanctis, supra n.56, at 8-9.
155

The process of induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its relationship to a
number of other specific propositions that are known to be true. A certain genus of situations with
identifiable characteristics can be defined from a synthesis of known situations (“species” of
situations, or “precedents”) that all share these characteristics. See Rapp, supra n.53, at §§ 5(C), 7.4.
Aristotle called a rhetorical induction an “example.” Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I,
ch. 2 at 1356b; Scharffs, supra n.53, at 752 & n.58; Schmidt, supra n.53, at 372-73.
156

The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal discourse and rhetoric
derived from the classical tradition, in which there are two permitted logical structures for an
argument, the deductive and the inductive. Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 1 at
1355a; Cicero, De Inventione, supra n.18, at 93; Quintilian, supra n.18 at 273. The forms for
effective legal discourse, as opposed to mathematical, scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic
rhetorical form known as an enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an example or
paradigm argument. Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b. See also George
A. Kennedy, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 40 & n. 49 (1991) (“Kennedy,
On Rhetoric”). Aristotle believed the enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms. Aristotle, The
Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.
157
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The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms)158 and the induction and
example (inductive forms)159 are topoi of arrangement in science, mathematics, and
rhetorical demonstration.160 By borrowing the structure of mathematics and
science, legal discourse can engage in open demonstration of the reasoning process

In the deductive structure, both syllogisms and enthymemes begin with a major premise and
follow with a minor premise so as to produce a conclusion. The difference between the two forms is
that in a true syllogism each major premise must be a true statement of absolute certainty, and the
minor premise also must be a true statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is
absolutely, irrefutably true. Corbett & Connors, supra note 4 at 38-48. This is referred to by
Aristotle as a “complete proof.” Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1357. In an
enthymeme, the major premise, whether it be explicitly stated or implied in the enthymeme, must be
most probably true. Corbett & Connors, supra note 4 at 53 (quoting Aristotle, THE LOGIC: PRIOR
ANALYTICS, Book II, ch. 27); Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 4 at 635-36; Michael Frost, Justice
Scalia's Rhetoric of Dissent: a Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.
J. 167, 168 n. 6 (2002) (Frost, Scalia’s Rhetoric); Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The
Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. L. WRITING 61, 77, 80, 81-84 (2001-2002). In other words, truth
with absolute certainty is not required, only probability of truth. Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at
53-54. Similarly, the minor premise must be most probably true, not absolutely, necessarily true.
Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 53-54. Corbett and Connor’s definition of enthymeme in the
Aristotelian sense is more appropriate for the evaluation of legal discourse than the more limited
definition of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism where one of the premises, usually the major
premise, is implicit and unstated. Accord, Eugene E. Ryan, ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF RHETORICAL
ARGUMENTATION 29-34, 36, 38-41 (1984); James A. Gardner, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4-5, 8, 37-38 (1993). As these authors point out, the implicit
major premise is one potential aspect of an enthymeme that would differentiate it from a true
syllogism, but it is not a requirement of every enthymeme. This produces a conclusion that also is
most probably true; but this is acceptable because the enthymeme’s purpose is to persuade, not to
establish or define a proposition as a matter of scientific proof. Id. at 53. See Frost, Greco-Roman
Legal Analysis, supra n.133, at 110.
158

In daily life, and particularly in the law, a rhetorician infrequently can state an induction with as
much certainty as the above example. Aristotle anticipates this when he differentiates a rhetorical
induction (an “example”) from a true induction. See Scharffs, supra n.53, at 752 & n. 58. In an
example, as in an enthymeme, the propositions induced by a representative sampling of species of
situations (cases or precedents) are asserted to be true to a high degree of probability, not certainty.
See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b, Book II, ch. 19 at 1392a-1392b.
159

The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the syllogism, while the
structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal argument is the enthymeme. See Aristotle, The
Rhetoric, supra n.18, at Book I, Ch. 1, at 1355a. In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of
the applicable legal principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the specific
circumstances of the case at hand, so as to describe a highly probable conclusion or prediction about
the application. Id. at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a.
160
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in a form that is recognized as authoritative and persuasive.161 The structure of the
argument takes the form of logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove the
proposition.162 Focusing on the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 uses of mathematical
forms and structure, this structure of argumentation is readily identifiable by
audiences, and communicates a proper logical structure to support the discourse
(rhetoric-2) as well as demonstrating internally consistent work of a competent
author (rhetoric-3).
Induction can inform the major premise of the deductive structure—the
process of development of the rules or standards through the process of rule
synthesis163 and explanatory synthesis.164 The deductive structure of the syllogism

See Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra n.25, at 38-39; Cooter & Ulen, supra n.27,
at 3, 4; Kritzer, supra n.31, at 42-43, 59;
161

George Pólya, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I OF MATHEMATICS AND
PLAUSIBLE REASONING v-vi (1954); McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra n.4, at 752,
760. The pros and cons of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is
growing in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009-10. E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith versus
Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443,
445, 451-52, 455-56 (2010).
162

Rule synthesis is a synthesis of authorities found to be on point and controlling of a legal question
in order to accurately determine and state the prevailing law—the rules—that govern a legal issue.
Authorities that control the disposition of a legal issue must be reconciled for their explicit
statements and pronouncements of the governing legal standards as well as examined for implicit
requirements that are induced from the controlling authorities. See, e.g., Helene S. Shapo, Elizabeth
Fajans & Mary R. Falk, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999);
Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christina L. Kunz, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND
WRITING chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 2007); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING
chs. 10-13 (5th ed. 2005); Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline?
Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (2002). Legal analysis employs
synthesis of the rules to make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles that
govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the “R” (Rule) section of the discourse, or the first
half of the major premise of the legal reasoning syllogism. Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and
Analysis, supra n.56, chs. 2, 5, 6.
163

Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a separate process of induction of
principles of interpretation and application concerning the prevailing rules governing a legal issue.
The induction is from samples—namely case law—representing specific situations with concrete
164
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and enthymeme provides the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of
legal discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT.165 The rhetorical logos
structures of law and economics are a highly recommended form for persuasive
discourse under modern argument theory and the contemporary rhetoric theory of
discourse communities.166 This use of mathematical structure creates meaning and
communicates persuasive discourse to each possible audience through level 1, 2,
and 3 rhetoric.
2.

The atechnic pisteis or (non(non-artistic)
artistic) modes of Invention and
Arrangement of Mathematics and Science

Mathematics and science plays a direct role in contemporary legal analysis of
facts and data, statistics and reports, documents and contracts, sworn testimony
(including expert testimony), interviews, polls, and surveys—in short, we have come
a long way in the proper presentation of the atechnic pisteis or (non-artistic) modes
facts and in which the legal rules have been applied to produce a concrete outcome. While rule
synthesis is the component of legal analysis that determines what legal standards apply to and
control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to demonstrate and communicate how these legal
standards work in various situations relevant to the legal issue at hand. See Murray & DeSanctis,
Legal Writing and Analysis, chs. 6, 7 (discussing explanatory synthesis); Michael D. Murray, Rule
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 Leg. Com.
& Rhet. ___ (2011) [Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis] (forthcoming).
Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis, chs. 2, 6, 7 (discussing IRAC and TREAT);
Linda H. Edwards, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th
ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse); Robbins,
Paradigm Lost 484-87, 492 (discussing IRAC and IREAC); Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory
Synthesis, supra n.169; James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006)
(discussing IRAC and IREAC).
165

The legal writing discourse community has an expectation that the syllogistic structures of IRAC,
IREAC, or TREAT will be employed, thus the rhetorical lesson is not to disappoint this audience
with a non-syllogistic structure. See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing,
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is “Logic”
Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEG.
EDUC. 157, 164-77 (1997).
166
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of invention. In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and
securities law, and the calculation of damages in almost every area of contract, tort
and property law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive
element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or
damages. In addition, at a second level of rhetoric, the use of scientific and
mathematical tools as topoi for persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of
elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of
empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant tabular
presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion. In both
categories, the direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive
ordering and presentation of evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed as
a language to convince the reader of the evidence or proof of the proposition, and
thus is rhetorical.167
The use of such methods of persuasion has grown over the years168:

See Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley,
RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011.
167

Westlaw search “SHOWN DEPICT! DISPLAY! PICTURED REFER! /4 FIGURE GRAPH! CHART
TABULAR” with date restrictions for each decade, e.g., date(>1999) & date(<2010), in ALLCASES
and JLR databases.
168
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This chart reports a single search in each decade for figures, charts, graphics, and
tabular material, and there is no simple way to control for uses that are proof of
elements (such as damages) or ordering of data and information for persuasion (e.g.,
evidence). But the point of the chart is that whatever uses are made of figures,
chart, graph, or table, the uses are going up in cases and law reviews in each
decade, and markedly so in the last two decades in law review and journal articles.
The substantive use of mathematical forms to create meaning and
communicate understanding is the topic in this section. The more artistic and
stylistic use of mathematical forms is discussed in the next section.
3.

RhetoricRhetoric-3 uses of Mathematics and Science as a Trope of Style

Style (Latin elocutio; Greek lexis) pertains to the composition and wording of
the discourse, including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech.169 Figures of

See generally Smith, supra n.8, at 133-34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in classical rhetoric);
Corbett and Connors, supra n.11, at 20, 378.
169
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speech were divided into schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary
arrangements of words), and tropes (creative variations on the meanings of
words).170 Style is dependent on the speaker, the context and setting, and the
audience, and the classical rhetoricians made recommendations for dividing
discourse into one of three levels of style: the low or plain style (Latin infinum or

humile; Greek ischnos) whose purpose is to teach the audience, the middle style
(Latin aequabile or mediocre; Greek mesos) whose purpose is to please the
audience, and the grand style (Latin supra or magniloquens; Greek adros) whose
purpose is to move the audience.171
The audience and the situation for the discourse are, of course, very
important to the analysis of the best arguments that can be raised,172 so modern
argument theory calls for advocates to pay particular attention to the audience and
situation of their argument.173
Mathematical forms (charts, diagrams, four-quadrant tables, algebraic
formulas) can stimulate thought and imagination, leading to rhetoric-3 appreciation
of the persuasiveness of the discourse.

170

Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 51 & n.179.

See generally Frost, Lost Heritage, supra n.18, at 617-18; Frost, Greco Roman Legal Analysis,
supra n.133, at 188-89;

171

172

Bitzer, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; Greenhaw, supra n.9, at 675-80.

173

Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra n.8, at 139.
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Example 1174:

This chart is intended to report “Ratings Of Challenges Facing Successful
Operations Of A Business In Russia (Among Selected Major Brandholders And
Trademark Owners Doing Business In Russia),” and it is offered to demonstrate
that intellectual property protection is perceived to be a primary challenge
confronting international companies doing business in Russia.175 The author
describes the methodology in the following way: “In the survey, respondents were
asked to rate a series of ‘challenges confronting the successful operations of your
business in Russia’ using a five-point scale, where one meant ‘least important’ and
five meant ‘most important.’ More than one-half (52%) of selected major
brandholders and trademark owners doing business in Russia gave a rating of five
to intellectual property protection. This ranks intellectual property protection on
virtually the same high level of concern as customs (54%) and taxes (52%) — which
Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights, <http://www.cipr.org/activities/surveys/top50/
index.htm> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
174

175

Id.
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have historically been perceived as presenting the greatest challenges to business
success in Russia.”176
Nothing in this chart is particularly mathematical except the fact that the
author crunched some numbers to produce the chart, but the demonstration of the
data in a bar graph with a super-imposed variable line graph makes the
presentation all the more authoritative in a rhetoric-3 sense because it appears that
a complicated mathematical formula was applied to data to produce this graph.
Example 2177:

176

Id.

H. Taylor Buckner, Ph.D., Concordia's "Gun Control" Petition: Ignorance of the Law is the Only
Excuse, http://www.tbuckner.com/IGNOLAW.HTM (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).

177
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I consider example 2 to be an excellent use of scientific charting (taking the
form of an informational or decisional flow chart) to make a rhetorical-3 point: the
procedure for acquiring a firearm in Quebec is too complicated.
Example 3178:

This chart discusses the rise and fall of city names in English language
literature, and claims that this Google Lab chart reports the results of a search of
city names in the vast amount of literature that Google has scanned and compiled
for searching.179 The chart purports to tell us something about “the relative

Android6 blog, The Fall and Rise of Twitter in English Literature, < http://android6.net/the-falland-rise-of-twitter-in-english-literature/> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
178

179

Id.
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importance of different power centers in the public imagination.”180 The author
could have stated (in plain English): when searching for “Paris, London, New York,
Boston and Rome,” in the scanned English literature from 1750 to 2008, interest in
London remained steady and at a higher level than Paris, Boston, and Rome, while
interest in New York started at very low point but grew steadily, surpassing London
in approximately 1910, and continued to rise in popularity until 1980, when it
began a steady decline.” This would have accurately stated the purported findings,
but the graphing of the information sends a very different rhetoric-3 message—that
something scientific was done, and produced the results the readers see before
them.
Mathematical forms are a persuasive tool, but the tool is only as good as the
user, and the user must be careful about proper uses in proper situations. In
general legal discourse, the use of law and economics mathematical and scientific
forms and schemes as an artistic or stylistic mode comes with a word of caution that
is grounded in the very discipline from which the rhetorical use of such forms is
drawn: Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the rhetorical
primacy of scientific and mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses,
designing the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics,
and information collected to test the hypotheses.181 Law and economics also

180

Id.

See Posner, Foreword, supra n.29, at 5; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra n.2, at 15-16;
Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies--An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
437, 437 (1972). See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law,
Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493
(1998); Gary Minda, supra n.52, at 611-12.
181
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assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to
openly demonstrate the analyses and reveal its theses about human behavior for
examination and critique.182 The rhetorical power of a mathematical proof or a
demonstration of a scientific deduction or induction lies is the openness and
transparency of the demonstration. The premises (major and minor) and the nature
of the hypothesis induced from the comparison of genus and species of data must be
fully disclosed and described so as to allow the presentation to be analyzed and
rebutted. The assertions made in reference to the information displayed must be
falsifiable; tautological explication (the information is what it is) adds nothing to
meaning or understanding, and does not contribute to the mode of persuasion that
points to truth. At worst, using mathematical forms simply to dazzle or confuse the
audience or obfuscate the relevant information pertinent to the issue is the worst
form of trickery (mere rhetoric, not actual rhetoric). Consider the following chart of
the Obama Health Care Reform initiative183:

See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 57, 59 (1990);
Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).

182

Paul Ibrahim, Politics, Economics, and More blog, <http://www.paulibrahim.com/blog/2009/7/16/
get-well-soon-health-care-bureaucracy-chart.html> (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
183
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I may be wrong, but I don’t think the intention of the author of this chart was to
make clear the available options offered under the health care reform initiative.
B. Rhetorical Lessons in Defining Legal Phenomena as Incentives and Costs
This section will discuss: (1) rhetoric-3 uses of incentives and costs as a trope
of style (i.e., a figure of speech using incentives and costs as a metaphor in
discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 concept of incentives and costs in
the organization and presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention and
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse and whether it
creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).
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1. Incentives and Costs as a RhetoricRhetoric-3 Trope of Style
Economics and behavioral science informs legal discourse and communication
by pointing out that people respond to incentives. Contemporary law and
economics, informed by the lessons of behavioral science, offers a rhetorical
perspective on legal discourse and communication because the study of persuasion
in legal communication involves an analysis of what an author (speaker, writer,
communicator) can do to create incentives to attract or motivate the reader
(listener, etc.) while avoiding imposing costs on the reader.
A trope is “a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a
word.”184 Metaphor is a trope of style in rhetoric, one of the figures of speech
described and applied within the canon of style.185 Metaphor is one of the “master
tropes,” the others being metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.186 Numerous
disciplines have studied the power of metaphor in discourse, including linguistics,
184

Edward P.J. Corbett, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 461 (1971).

Professor Stephanie A. Gore, in “A Rose By Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors For New
Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 404-05 (2003), defines a metaphor as follows: “A

185

‘metaphor’ is defined as a ‘figure of speech in which a word or phrase that ordinarily designates one
thing is used to designate another, thus making an implicit comparison.’ THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). A metaphor may also be defined as ‘an
implied analogy imaginatively identifying one object with another and ascribing to the first object
one or more of the qualities of the second.’ C. Hugh Holman & William Harmon, A HANDBOOK TO
LITERATURE 298 (5th ed. 1986). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics elegantly defines
metaphor as ‘[a] condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by the presence
of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be enhanced in vividness, complexity, or breadth of
implication.’ PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 490 (Ales Preminger ed., enlarged
ed., 1974).”
Burke, Grammar of Motives, supra n.19, at Appx. D. Burke described the master tropes as
follows: For metaphor we could substitute perspective; For metonymy we could substitute reduction;
For synecdoche we could substitute representation; For irony we could substitute dialectic. Id.
(emphasis omitted).
186
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philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and literary theory.187 Recent literary
and cognitive studies of metaphor188 have shown that:
Literary analysis and cognitive psychology theory analyze the use and effect
of metaphors in ways that resemble the techniques of their Greco-Roman
counterparts. In some recent discussions of metaphors' place in legal
discourse, analysts reject the view that metaphors are merely superficial
stylistic devices. They assert, with Haig Bosmajian, that “it is now well
established that the tropes, especially the metaphor, are not simply rhetorical
flourishes used to embellish discourse.”189 Instead, these analysts maintain
that metaphors are essential devices for achieving certain sorts of intellectual
insights. Classical rhetoricians' recognized that metaphors provide insights
or “fresh knowledge”190 that can “scarcely be conveyed”191 by other means.
Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 91920 (2007) (citing Linguistics sources: George Lakoff, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with Mark
Johnson); George Lakoff, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT
THE MIND (1987); George Lakoff, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR
(1989) (with Mark Turner); George Lakoff, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
THINK (1996); George Lakoff, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark Johnson); George Lakoff, "DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT:
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE” THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004);
George Lakoff, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND VISION (2006);
Philosophy sources: Mark Johnson, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with George Lakoff); Mark
Johnson, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR (Mark Johnson ed., 1981); Mark Johnson, THE
BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); Mark Johnson,
MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1993); Mark Johnson,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999)
(with George Lakoff); Rhetoric sources: Michael H. Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric
Reasoning, in INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005); Michael R.
Smith, The Power of Metaphor and Simile in Persuasive Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING:
THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 179, 179 (1st ed. 2002); Cognitive psychology
sources: Steven L. Winter, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371
(1988); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989); and Literary Theory
sources: Michael R. Smith, The Functions of Literary References in Persuasive Writing: A
Multidisciplinary Analysis, in Advanced Legal Writing, supra n.12, at 9, 15-30 (discussing “Literary
References for Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison”).
187

E.g., Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 L. WRITING 113, 135-38
(1996) [Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor].

188

Id. (citing Haig Bosmajian, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 441 (1992). See also
Haig Bosmajian, “The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First
Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers,” 444 J.L. & EDUC. 443 (1986)).
189

190

Id. (citing Aristotle, The Rhetoric, supra n.18, at 206).
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Under this view, metaphors become important intellectual components of
legal analysis rather than mere mnemonic or focusing devices.192

Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo warned that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it.”193
The rhetorical path that uses incentives and costs as a metaphor for
conditions and effects in the law is a well-traveled path in legal discourse.194 Every
time an author writes about a cost-benefit analysis, the use of the term “cost”
stands in as a metaphor, a rhetorical trope that attempts to transfer the concept of
a cost onto to the understanding of the actual action or condition described. The
word “benefit” similarly stands in to communicate a beneficial meaning to the
reader concerning the actual effect or change in condition discussed in the
discourse. Every time a change in the law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct,
the concept of “incentive” is a metaphor for the intention of the actor to motivate a
certain reaction by offering something desired by the recipient. Every time a license
or permit application process is said to provide a “disincentive” to an activity, the
term “disincentive” is used to convey the negative effects of the condition described

191

Id. (citing Cicero, De Oratore, supra n.18, at 123).

192

Id. at 135-37.

Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). Thus, Judge
Cardozo used a metaphor (liberation or enslavement of thought) to criticize the use of metaphors in
law.
193

194

Note the metaphor I am using here. Metaphors are unavoidable in legal discourse.
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in the discourse. Every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an
“externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses “externality” as a figure of
speech to suggest that the law imposes a “cost” that is not internalized by one or
more of the parties in the discussion. This is in fact a metaphor within a
metaphor—both “cost” and “internalize” are used metaphorically in this example.
By using the terms “incentives” and “costs” metaphorically, legal authors can
discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not
necessarily business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of
pecuniary sums or damages.195 This expansion in language may improve
communication—the enlightening aspect of metaphor in discourse. Of course, with
regard to proper ethos, the recommendation to use metaphor in rhetoric-3
applications comes with Judge Cardozo’s highly metaphorical warning not to let the
metaphor enslave the reader’s thinking on the topic.
2.

RhetoricRhetoric-2 and RhetoricRhetoric-3 incentives and costs of organization
and pre
presentation of the discourse as topics
topics of invention and
arrangement

The economic rhetorical use of incentives and costs also has rhetoric-2 and
rhetoric-3 application in the organization and presentation of the discourse as topics
In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the
calculation of damages in almost every area of law), mathematical analysis informs or constructs the
substantive element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages.
In addition, at the level rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as topoi for
persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case—e.g., surveys, statistical
and quantitative analyses of empirical data, diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant
tabular presentation of data—is a well established method of persuasion. In both categories, the
direct proof of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of
evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language to convince the reader of the
evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is rhetorical. See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, Thinking
Like a Rhetor, supra n.19, at 118-21; Thomas Conley, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15
(1990); Simpson & Selden, supra n.98, at 1011.
195
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of invention and arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader). Contemporary
law and economics informs contemporary rhetorical studies of invention,
arrangement, and style adding to the knowledge-base of studies of writing as a
process and discourse community theory. The rhetorical perspective of economics
and behavioral science informs the study and understanding of effective legal
communication by demonstrating the means by which an author can create
incentives to attract or motivate the reader while avoiding imposing costs on the
reader. As one example, incentives can be created in legal communication and
transaction costs can be avoided in legal communication by compositional choices
made by the author through the use of a helpful, reader-oriented organizational
paradigm such as the TREAT paradigm.196 Incentives can be created and costs can
be avoided in legal communication by organization of the contents of
communications into rule formation (rule section) and separate explanation of how
the rule works (explanation section).197 Incentives can be created and costs can be
imposed in legal communication by the method of syntheses of authorities used to
demonstrate both the legal rules that govern the issue and how those legal rules
work in actual, concrete situations by the use of explanatory synthesis.198

196

Murray & DeSanctis, Legal Writing and Analysis, supra n.56, at ch. 6.

197

Id.

198

See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra n.169.
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C. Rhetorical Use of Efficiency in Legal Discourse
As specifically applied to the rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement,
and style, the rhetorical perspective of economics and behavioral science can inform
the discussion by demonstrating that efficiency supports the persuasiveness of legal
discourse.
1.

RhetoricRhetoric-3 use of Efficiency in Invention and Creation of
Meaning

Economic or productive efficiency is the application of the term “efficiency”
that is best known to non-economists. The advice for legal authors seeking
rhetoric-3 recognition of the meaning of the term when used outside of strict
economic analysis is to use the term “efficiency” or “efficient” to refer to an
avoidance of waste, a reduction in costs (transaction costs, collateral costs, or
externalities), or other savings in time or money that have been or would be brought
about by a change in the law. Saving money or time is nearly universally valued as
a goal in life and in the law. Emphasis of efficiency—the phrasing and defining of
elements of the circumstance in terms of efficiency in the time or cost saving
sense—is rhetorically valuable.
2.

RhetoricRhetoric-2 and Rhetoric
Rhetoric-3 Efficiency in Arrangement and Style

Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the form, structure,
and composition of economic discourse. This lesson from the canons of law and
economics teaches legal authors to follow a prescription to make their discourse
clear, concise, succinct, and elegant in form. The formal use of the term efficiency
benefits clarity and promotes comprehension of meaning over confusion and
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frustration. It opens doors to falsifiability because the material is more accessible
for analysis and criticism if it is clear and succinct. The door to falsifiability is
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation in legal discourse.
Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted are highly persuasive.

D. Rhetorical Lessons from Contemporary Rational Choice Theory
The lessons for rhetorical discourse using the definition of rational choice in
contemporary law and economics have become more complicated as our
understanding of human behavior grows, but the consequences of the contemporary
theories of rational choice ultimately coincide with lessons learned from classical
rhetoric and modern studies of cognition and brain science. I will discuss the
rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice theory in three areas:
(1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to respond to biases and heuristics and to
situational conditions on rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement;
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and syllogistic
structure) to appeal to the rational audience; and (3) rhetoric-3 uses of pathoscentric modes of argument—metaphor, parable/mythical/fable forms, character
archetypes, and other forms of narrative reasoning—as topics of invention and
tropes of style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other heuristics and
biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from modern cognitive
studies and brain science.
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The Rhetorichetoric-1 importance of framing in Invention and
Arrangement

It is challenging to manage the modeling and framing of broad concepts such
as fairness and justice in economic theory, but the rhetorical implications of the
empirical observations in law and economics, cognitive studies, and brain science
reveal that people respond to justice and fairness in legal discourse. These studies
confirm what has been predicted by the advocates of the modes of persuasion of
logos, ethos, and pathos. Arguments framed from a more general perspective of how
the law and the public policy behind the law supports the argument are of course a
necessary part of legal discourse, and a legal author does not need law and
economics to tell her that.
Other theories developed through empirical testing of rational choice biases
and heuristics with a predictable effect on decision-making, such as the endowment
effect, the status quo bias, and risk/loss aversion, can be used to frame arguments.
For example, if an author combines two lessons from the experiments of behavioral
science—the experiments indicating that framing of choice matters because decision
making is context based,199 and the experiments indicating that the endowment
effect or status quo bias plays a strong role in contract negotiation200—creates a
rhetorical prescription for advocates: advocates should work to carefully and
advantageously define the starting point terms of a negotiation (which will, as
Cass R. Sunstein, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 4, 5 (2000) [Sunstein, Behavioral Law &
Economics]; Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, in Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics, supra at 61-62, 73-74, 76.
199

Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics, supra n.204, at 116-119, 120-121, 136-138.
200
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indicated by the experiments, be perceived and responded to as the status quo)201 or
the status of the current law from which the tribunal must move forward to
adjudicate the client’s matter (which, again, will be perceived as the status quo),202
and simultaneously work to frame the choices of departure in such a way that the
preferred outcome for a client is framed as an appropriate compromise choice—not
the most extreme or most expensive departure from the status quo starting
positions (as defined by the advocate), but not the smallest departure either.203
2.

RhetoricRhetoric-1 and RhetoricRhetoric-2 Logos Topics
Topics of Arrangement and
Invention (Inductive
(Inductive Synthesis and Syllogistic Structures
tructures) for
the Rational Audience (the Legal Writing Discourse
Community)

The overall structure of legal discourse, both in terms of invention and
arrangement, should be drafted with regard to the logos topics of syllogistic
structure and inductive synthesis. The rhetoric-1 audience of legal discourse is law
trained readers—the legal writing discourse community. The expectations of this
group manifestly support using a logical syllogistic structure for the overall
architecture of the discourse, and the Anglo-American theory of precedent and stare
decisis support the inductive structure of a synthesis of authorities to determine the
legal standards governing an issue. The lessons of modern cognitive studies and
brain science that challenge many of the assumptions, premises, and paradigms of
traditional rational choice theory in law and economics do not wipe the slate clean
201

See Korobkin, supra n.205, at 136.

202

Id. at 137.

203Kelman,

Rottenstreich, & Tversky, supra n.205, at 74-76.
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from the expectations of the legal writing discourse community and its basic
conventions for organization and demonstration. Even if indirect audiences are
contemplated, in rhetoric-2 persuasion, the logical syllogistic structure is a widely
accepted method of demonstration. If used properly with appropriate attention to
the ethos of the discussion, the structure opens up the premises and evidence of the
discussion to examination and potential criticism or rebuttal. A proper synthesis
identifies the species that are examined as well as the newly identified genus
principles that are induced from the species, or it identifies the existing genus
principles that are applied to the newly identified species of the genus depending on
which side of the induction the discussion falls. In short, in invention and
arrangement, there is no ready substitute for the logical syllogistic structure of legal
discourse and the inductive structure of synthesis.
3.

RhetoricRhetoric-3 Rational Choice Lessons concerning PathosPathos-Based
Modes of Persuasion to Address Cognitive and Situational
Effects on Decisionecision-making

A significant part of contemporary law and economics’ rational choice theory
is under examination to challenge the assertion that legal decision-makers are
autonomous individuals weighing costs and benefits in individualistic terms,
unaffected by context and situation. Under the traditional and still prevailing
doctrine of rational choice, rational decision-making should not be affected by
situation, meaning that choices that maximize the decision-makers’ ends should not
be affected by situation. The values and interests implicated by a choice may be
different from individual to individual, but once identified, the choices made in
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recognition of the same values and interests should not change from situation to
situation. Cognitive studies and brain science on situational decision-making take
the opposite tack based on empirical evidence and argue that decisions are affected
by biases and heuristics that are connected to the context and situation of the
decision-making.204
Cognitive studies and brain science have worked a similar correction in
contemporary rhetoric’s modern argument theory: the assumptions and premises of
classical and traditional theories of rhetoric regarding audience have been refined
by modern social science and cognitive studies that redefine the concept of the
rhetorical situation in a way that affects every part of persuasive discourse, the
audience, the message, and the speaker.205 The lessons learned in both
contemporary law and economics and contemporary rhetoric can inform both
disciplines to improve theories, predictions, and prescriptions about changes in
economic analysis of law and legal discourse.
Situational decision-making often implicates the different values that people
assign to different choices depending on the context and situation in which the
decision is to be made,206 and a rhetorical examination of values leads to the

See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra n.6; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,
supra n.6; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 105-09 (2002).
204

See, e.g., Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra n.19, at 6-8, 389-92; White, Law as Rhetoric,
supra n.14, at 695; Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial, supra n.17, at 1546; Robbins-Tiscione,
Rhetoric For Legal Writers, supra n.17, at 9; Makay, Speaking with an Audience, supra n.17, at 9.
205

Mitchell, supra n.209, at 101-10, 160-64; Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of
Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 & n.24, 614-15, 625-26, 644-45 (2003); Jack L.
Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, in CHOICES,
206
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analysis of pathos207—the emotional response to persuasive discourse208—because
values appear in contemporary brain science to be the most important trigger of
emotional conviction.209 Contemporary rhetoric encompasses examination and

VALUES, AND FRAMES 171 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). See also Amos Tversky &
Itamar Simonson, Context-dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1179 (1993); Itamar
Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J.
MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992).
Pathos is one of the three artistic topoi of invention, an essential mode of persuasion in classical
rhetoric. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 99 (Thomas O. Sloan ed., 2001); Robert F. Blomquist,
Dissent Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 69 MO. L. REV.
73, 158 (2004). Quintilian put great stock in emotional appeals, Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, supra n.45, at 91, claiming that, “this emotional power . . . dominates the court [;] it is this
form of eloquence that is queen of all.” 2 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, supra n.18, at 419.
Quintilian, like Aristotle, thought that “the duty of the [advocate] is not merely to instruct: the
power of eloquence is greatest in emotional appeals.” Id. at 139; see Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal
Audience, supra n.45, at 91. Over-reliance on the logos, the logical presentation, of an argument
may be a myopic tendency of lawyers, but it is likewise clear that pathos cannot be controlled
directly by legal argument. Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 78. See also Kenneth D. Chestek,
Judging By the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 1, 3, 5, 29-30 (2010)
(an empirical study of the persuasiveness of logos-centric vs. pathos-centric briefs). The classical
rhetoricians recognized that our emotions are not entirely under the control of our will and our
intellect. Corbett & Connors, supra n.11, at 78. We cannot use logic to argue an audience into an
emotional state any more than we can will ourselves into an emotional reaction based on an
intellectual conviction that we should have a certain emotional reaction to a certain set of facts or a
particular logical appeal. See id. An advocate that explicitly announces that he or she will play on
the audience’s emotions in the presentation of the discourse will inevitably achieve the opposite
result; the audience, made wary of emotional manipulation, will at best steel themselves not to be
manipulated and at worst will discount the advocate’s presentation on the grounds that the advocate
has engaged in trickery and subterfuge. See id. at 78-79. Thus, the advocate must not openly play
upon the audience’s heart strings, but instead must carefully and subtly arrange the facts and
narrative reasoning of the case in conjunction with the logic and legal reasoning of the argument.
See id.; Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra n.45, at 94; Chestek, supra, at 2, 3, 5, 29-32.
207

See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 55, 57, 59 (1997); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation - Part I: Classical Rhetoric
and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 92 (1993). See also EMOTIONS,
COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR 112 (Carroll E. Izard et al. eds., 1984); Arlie Russell Hochschied, THE
MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983); Carroll E. Izard, HUMAN
EMOTIONS (1977).
208

See Antonio R. Damasio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 96-97,
170-75, 250 (1994) [Damasio, Descartes’ Error]; Antonio R. Damasio, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY,
SORROW, AND THE FEELING BRAIN 54 (2003). See also Robert F. Blomquist, The Pragmatically
Virtuous Lawyer?, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 93, 114, 133 (2009); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire:
The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381 (2008);
Stanchi, Science of Persuasion, at 411; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra n.12, at 28; Raymond Ross,
UNDERSTANDING PERSUASION 7 (3rd ed. 1990).
209
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consideration of the values of the audience, as well as their passions and biases, in
its study of the use of practical reasoning and informal logic, narrative reasoning
(and its many sub-categories—storytelling, mythical forms, parable forms, heroantihero archetypes), and the schemes and tropes of composition in analogical and
literary forms (e.g., schemes and figures of speech, metaphor theory, and literary
allusion).210 Contemporary law and economics describes the same type of
phenomena as biases and heuristics—anchoring, status quo bias, endowment effect
bias, risk/loss aversion, representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and
probability assessment dysfunctionality.211 Contemporary rhetoric applies cognitive

Damasio describes the brain process of somatic marking which is used to evaluate experience of
the world, tagging certain facts as useful and valuable toward an objective, and rejecting many
others. In decision-making, such as the task of jurors, the process involves the somatic marking of
evidence for its salience toward the decision, winnowing down the possible choices and their
consequences based on the somatic marker (loosely characterized as a "gut feeling") assigned to the
evidence. (Contemporary legal economists and behavioral scientists would characterize this as the
application of affect heuristics. E.g., Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of
Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 2 (2000)). Jurors then seek a narrative that
makes sense fitting the marked evidence into a coherent, lifelike, believable story. Jurors can supply
their own narrative, or the advocate can supply a lifelike, believable storyline that fits the facts (and
assists the client), which emphasizes the need for storytelling as a tool of narrative reasoning in legal
discourse. See generally Damasio, Descartes’ Error, supra, at 170-75; Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional
Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1628, 1631-33 (2007).

See, e.g., Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in the Law: Myth, Metaphor and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REV. 883 (2010); Smith, Advanced Legal Writing, supra n.12, at ch. 3; J. Christopher
Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEG. WRITING 53 (2008);
Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEG. WRITING 127 (2008); Ruth
Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers, and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using the
Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006); Philip
N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 LEG. WRITING 229 (2006); Brian J. Foley & Ruth
Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write
Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001); Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the
Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation To The Legal Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 457 (2001); Linda H.
Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEG.
STUD. FORUM 7 (1996).
210

Korobkin & Ulen, supra n.5, at 1076-78; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra n.5, at 1471-550; Russell
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in Sunstein, Behavioral
Law and Economics, supra n.204, at 116-43; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship : A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499-540 (1998);
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studies and brain science to inform the predictions of audience reaction and
motivation produced by the use of certain topics of invention or tropes of style,212
much in the same way that contemporary law and economics looks to cognitive
studies and brain science for the same lessons in audience reaction and
motivation.213
There are two rhetorical lessons to be drawn from this observation: first,
that a single rhetorical approach to discourse may miss the audience and fall short
of the rhetorical situation. Discourse should be crafted in layers, and by this I do
not simply mean the rhetoric-1, -2, or -3 levels pertaining to different audiences, but
rather the use of multiple layers using different modes of persuasion directed at the
same audience for the same level of rhetorical communication. Second, that a
writer should consider pathos-based modes of persuasion, such as narrative theory
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1128-1130 (1974).
For example, the evaluation of the use of metaphor as a method of pathos-based persuasion and
transmission of meaning has caused rhetoricians to look to social science and cognitive studies to
study the effects of metaphor in communication. E.g., Frost, Greco-Roman Metaphor, supra n.193,
at 135-38; Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions 152, 441 (1992); Steven L.
Winter, Death is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745, 759 (1992) (reviewing Thomas C.
Grey, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991)); Burr Henly,
“Penumbra”: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L. QRTY. 82 (1987); Haig
Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First
Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers, 444 J. L. & EDUC. 443 (1986); Edward L. Murray,
The Phenomenon of the Metaphor: Some Theoretical Considerations, 2 DUQUESNE STUDIES IN
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 288 (A. Giorgi, C. Fischer & E. Murray, eds., 1975); James B.
White, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 695,
707 (1973); Owen Barfield, POETIC DICTION: A STUDY IN MEANING 63-64 (1964).
212

Most if not all of the sources on behavioral law and economics indicate a trend toward
incorporating cognitive studies, and the most cutting edge of these sources point toward new ways of
understanding incentives and motivation through brain science. See, e.g., John N. Drobak &
Douglass C. North, Understanding Judicial Decision-Making: The Importance Of Constraints On
Non-Rational Deliberations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 131 (2008); Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe,
& Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35 (2005); Anne C. Dailey, The
Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1599 (2000).
213
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and storytelling modes to target the values of the audience in the situation and
present discourse that the audience will identify and accept, perhaps not as the sole
mode of persuasion, but as one layer in the communication.

Conclusion
The rhetorical canons of law and economics are tools for legal discourse, not
universal goals and not perfect solutions. Law and economics provides a rhetorical
lens through which a legal author might examine and improve the persuasiveness
of her discourse. But a lens like any other tool is only as good as its user.
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved upon the
basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of human nature of the ancient
rhetoricians, but the more complex models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric
have not replaced the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Contemporary rhetoric
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that confirm the
importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos and the necessity that
rhetoric examine the values of the audience in the rhetorical situation so as to
anticipate the emotional reaction of the audience to the discourse. Similar lessons
are being learned in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate our study of
motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks to improve the designing of
incentives in the face of new conceptions of rational choice. Each discipline can
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learn lessons from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different
audiences in different situations.
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of contemporary
rhetoric, law and economics. Efficiency, when used in appropriate ways in
appropriate rhetorical situations, can improve discourse in style, arrangement, and
invention. The expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of laws and legal policy; its widespread acceptance in
the law is only further evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many
areas of the law and many legal situations. The persuasiveness of mathematics and
science extends to their forms and the substance of their proofs, and the use of the
methods and forms may create meaning and inspire imagination that improves
comprehension and understanding. The forms of mathematics and science can
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of the workings of
the discourse and promoting the opportunity for falsification and rebuttal.
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not universally
persuasive. A topic of invention is a single place to find a method of argumentation,
not the only place. Many audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific
forms especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of fairness
or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form (elegance, openness, and clarity)
and in the elimination of costs and waste may be widely persuasive, but other
economic rhetorical turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best
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left to rhetoric-1 discourse of economists. Incentives and costs is a language, and
many rhetorical situations accept this language, but the general application must
fit the topic and the situation; simply identifying something as an incentive or a cost
will not be persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different topos for
argument or a more apt trope of style.
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law and
economics. Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of contemporary economics
start with the assertion that mathematical and scientific methods of daunting
complexity are used to hide the workings of the reasoning, not to promote
understanding or persuasion. The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the cudgel,
used to overpower the audience with coercion not persuasion. The formula might
hide the workings of the reasoning rather than openly demonstrate the reasoning
for falsification or rebuttal, all under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the
force of such a powerful device. Charts and diagrammatics may be used to distract
the audience or trick them into believing a mathematical or scientific analysis was
performed to produce the assertions made in the rhetoric, when little or no math or
science was involved. Quantitative analysis may crunch data whose true meaning
is buried in the assumptions made that chose what data to collect and what to
exclude, and in the premises drawn from the assumptions that determined the
possible conclusions that could be drawn from the experiment or analysis.
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science, efficiency, incentives
and costs, and rational choice theory for rhetoric-1 communication with legal
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economists, but often uses the same topics and tropes as powerful props in rhetoric2 and rhetoric-3 communication with lawmakers and policy-makers—again, rightly
or wrongly according to the ethos of the speaker and the communication.214 The
canons of law and economics rhetoric, like the canons of the other schools of
contemporary rhetoric, may be employed to promote effective communication for the
purpose of persuasion, or be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse, obfuscate, or
coerce the audience. This is a lesson for all rhetoricians, those of law and economics
and of general legal discourse.

My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt comment, “Statistics
never lie—but liars use statistics.”
214

